Endangerment  of the Common Law: Do Rulemakings as to Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act Displace Federal Common-Law Claims for the Public Nuisance of Global Warming? by Grimm, Kyle G.
GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011 9:16 AM 
 
671 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As technology has continued to develop over the past century, 
global air pollution has also increased.
1
  Yet it was not until the later 
part of the twentieth century that legislation was adopted to address 
this issue.
2
  With the recent increase in global air pollution, environ-
mental activists started to press for action to protect our natural re-
sources and to minimize the negative effects caused by this pollution.
3
  
Lately, particular attention has been placed on global climate 
change.  One method of addressing this issue has been through the 
initiation of public-nuisance lawsuits seeking redress for the effects of 
global warming.
4
  Now that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has taken regulatory action to address the emission of green-
house gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere, the question of whether 
these administrative rulemakings displace public-nuisance-as-global-
warming causes of action must be addressed. 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Union 
College.  Thanks to Professor Marc Poirier, Professor Catherine McCauliff, and all of 
my editors on the Seton Hall Law Review for their insightful comments throughout the 
writing process. 
 1 See generally The History of Air Quality, ENVTL. INS. OF HOUSTON, 
http://prtl.uhcl.edu/portal/page/portal/EIH/outreach/tfors/history (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2010) (noting major events throughout the history of air pollution, as well 
as governmental and private responses to the growing concern over the conse-
quences of air pollution). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
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In the past few decades the effects of GHGs in the atmosphere—
most importantly carbon dioxide (CO2)
5
—have taken center stage in 
the air-pollution debate as global climate change is becoming more 
and more apparent.
6
  A general consensus now exists in the scientific 
community that the release of carbon dioxide and other GHGs into 
the atmosphere, due in part to human activity, contributes to global 
warming.
7
  Global warming leads to changes in weather patterns, ris-
ing sea levels, a decrease in snow cover, and poses a risk of extreme 
weather, among other effects.
8
  Arctic ice, for example, has decreased 
in thickness by forty percent since the 1960s.
9
  In turn, this has led 
some to predict that global sea levels will rise between ten to twenty-
three inches by 2100.
10
  Similarly, as ocean temperature has risen over 
the last thirty-five years, the number of category four and five hurri-
canes has increased.
11
  Furthermore, the wildland fire season saw a 
record-breaking year in 2006 for both the number of acres burned 
 
 5 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,895 (proposed Apr. 
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“[C]arbon dioxide is the most impor-
tant greenhouse gas directly emitted by human activities in terms of its total addi-
tional heating effects being exerted on the climate.”); Herve Le Treut et al., Historical 
Overview of Climate Change Science, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
BASIS 93, 97 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter1.pdf. 
 6 See Le Treut et al., supra note 5, at 100.  
 7 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,888 (“The heating ef-
fect caused by human-induced buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is very 
likely the cause of most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years.” (em-
phasis added)).  The term “very likely” is a word of art used by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—the body charged with researching global climate 
change by the United Nations—which means that there is a 90 to 99 percent proba-
bility of its occurrence.  See id. at 18,888 n.2.  IPCC shared the Nobel Peace Prize with 
Al Gore in 2007 “for [its] efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge 
about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that 
are needed to counteract such change.”  Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Commit-
tee, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/press.html. 
 8 Morgan McCue Sport, Comment, An Inconvenient Suit: California v. General 
Motors Corporation and a Look at Whether Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Pub-
lic Nuisance or a Nonjusticiable Political Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 591–93 (2007). 
 9 The Consequences of Global Warming on Glaciers and Sea Level, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fcons/fcons4.asp (last visited Dec. 
30, 2010).  
 10 Id.  
 11 The Consequences of Global Warming on Weather Patterns, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fcons/fcons1.asp (last visited Dec. 
30, 2010).  
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and the number of fires reported.
12
  These changes indicate the ur-
gent need for action to address global climate change and, conse-
quently, the emission of GHGs into the atmosphere. 
Starting in the early part of the past decade, several plaintiffs—
perhaps unhappy with a lack of legislative action to address global 
climate change—initiated common law public nuisance actions 
against producers of GHGs.
13
  These plaintiffs have pointed to the 
contribution of GHGs to global climate change and to the negative 
effects of this change to argue that there is sufficient harm to impart 
standing.  Plaintiffs have sought both damages and injunctions 
against polluting activity in these cases.  District courts, however, have 
refused to decide these issues on the merits by holding that the caus-
es and effects of global warming present a nonjusticiable political 
question.
14
  These courts have held that at least one of several Baker 
factors
15
 is “inextricably linked” to this question, and thus the ques-
tions that these cases pose are nonjusticiable.
16
 
District courts located in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits 
have used the political-question doctrine to dismiss global-warming-
 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 14 See Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 883; GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 68547, at *48; Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
 15 “Baker factors” refers to the case Baker v. Carr, the landmark case in which the 
Supreme Court laid down the current framework of the political-question doctrine.  
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  Specifically, the Court stated that the justiciabili-
ty of a claim depends on “whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and 
its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be 
judicially molded.”  Id. at 198.  The Court then announced six different instances, 
referred to as the “Baker factors,” in which a political question is presented and a 
claim is therefore nonjusticiable.  These tests include the following:  
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discovera-
ble and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility 
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due to 
coordinate branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question.   
Id. at 217. 
 16 See GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *38–48 (holding that the first three 
Baker factors are indicated in a global-warming-as-public-nuisance action). 
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as-public-nuisance claims.  The first such case to be dismissed on po-
litical-question grounds was Connecticut v. American Electric Power Com-
pany (AEP).
17
  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recent-
ly vacated the district court’s ruling and held that global-warming-as-
public-nuisance claims do in fact present justiciable questions over 
which district courts can exercise jurisdiction.
18
  Similar to the Second 
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Comer v. Murphy Oil 
USA, also reversed a district court ruling that held global-warming-as-
public-nuisance claims present nonjusticiable political questions.
19
  
Thus, the two circuit courts to decide this issue have held in favor of 
the plaintiffs and allowed these suits to move forward. 
Notably, however, this is not a settled question.  In December 
2010, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certi-
orari to decide this question, among others presented in AEP.
20
  
Moreover, subsequent to the panel decision in Comer, the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted a rehearing en banc, which temporarily vacated the pan-
el decision.
21
  Several months later, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the 
appeal for a lack of quorum because too many judges were forced to 
recuse themselves from the case.
22
  This action had the effect of per-
manently vacating the panel decision and reinstating the district 
court opinion.
23
  Therefore, neither the Second nor Fifth Circuit opi-
 
 17 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 18 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 19 585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), 
appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 20 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 21 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 
F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 22 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).    
 23 Id. at 1055.  The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the argument that because of 
the procedural posture of the case, the circuit should be “dis-enbanced” and the 
panel decision reinstated.  Id. at 1054  
This case was properly voted en banc. The panel opinion and the 
judgment of the panel were lawfully vacated. Without a quorum to 
conduct any judicial business, this en banc court has no authority to 
rewrite the established rules of the Fifth Circuit for this one case and to 
order this case, properly voted en banc, ‘dis-enbanced.’ Moreover, we 
have no authority to interpret a plainly applicable rule as simply a 
blank, on grounds that ‘it was not designed to apply’ to a situation 
where its terms have undisputed application. 
Id.  Similarly, the court refused to hold the case in abeyance until a properly consti-
tuted quorum could be achieved.  Id.  
It is purely speculative as to when the current vacancy on this court will 
be filled and it is, of course, unknown whether that judge may also be 
recused. Furthermore, we have no way of knowing when another sitting 
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nions addressing this issue are dispositive for purposes of each par-
ticular case and are not binding precedent, although they continue 
to be persuasive authority.  Furthermore, not all district courts have 
agreed with the Second and Fifth Circuit decisions.  The Northern 
District of California recently held—subsequent to the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in AEP—that the court was without subject matter ju-
risdiction in a case where a native tribe of Inupiat Eskimos sued twen-
ty-four oil, energy, and utility companies for their contribution to 
global warming because the case presented nonjusticiable political 
questions.
24
  Although these circuit court rulings are not the last word 
on the matter, these decisions send a clear message that courts 
should no longer look for cover in this hotly debated area by relying 
on the political-question doctrine.  As Matt Pawa, lead attorney for 
the plaintiffs in AEP, recently said, “Global Warming polluters every-
where: you are on notice that you are committing a tort and we will 
sue you.”
25
 
Now that plaintiffs can potentially move forward with their glob-
al-warming-as-public-nuisance actions, another important issue arises: 
are federal public-nuisance claims for global warming displaced by 
federal statutory and regulatory law?  The Second Circuit held in AEP 
that at the time the case was decided no federal scheme “spoke di-
rectly” to the plaintiffs’ question in global-warming-as-public-nuisance 
actions and that such claims therefore were not displaced.
26
  Thus, 
further development of the federal statutory and regulatory law con-
cerning the emission of GHGs needs to occur before federal-public-
nuisance actions in this context are no longer viable, at least in the 
Second Circuit. 
The judiciary is not the only place in which opponents to GHG 
emissions have sought to exert their agenda; debate about limiting 
GHG emissions has also taken place in the legislative arena.  Recent-
 
judge in regular active service of the Court may become ‘undisquali-
fied’ or indeed whether another judge of this en banc court may be-
come disqualified to sit further. 
Id.  Three judges dissented in two vigorous opinions, which both argued that the ma-
jority deprived the litigants of their right to a direct appeal in violation of their statu-
tory rights on the basis of a local rule.  See id. at 1055–56 (Davis, J., dissenting); id. at 
1056–66 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 24 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009).  
 25 Oregondem, Sue a Polluter—New Green Light from the Courts, DAILY KOS (Sept. 22, 
2009, 3:55 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/22/785080/-Sue-a-
PolluterNew-Green-Light-from-the-Courts. 
 26 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 381.  The Fifth Circuit in Comer did not address 
this issue. 
GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:16 AM 
676 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:671 
ly, a cap-and-trade bill
27
 has been passed by the House of Representa-
tives.
28
  This bill, however, stalled in the Senate, and such a bill seems 
unlikely to pass in either legislative chamber during the 112th Con-
gress.
29
 
A more promising development concerning GHG regulation has 
come directly from the EPA.  In April 2009, Lisa Jackson, the new 
Administrator of the EPA, released a proposed endangerment and 
cause or contribute finding for greenhouse gases pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act (CAA or “the Act”) § 202(a) (the “proposed endan-
germent and cause or contribute finding”).
30
  Then, in December 
2009, Administrator Jackson released a final ruling in accordance 
with the proposed endangerment and cause or contribute finding 
(the “final endangerment and cause or contribute finding”).
31
  As 
part of the EPA’s administrative authority under the CAA, the Admin-
istrator may promulgate regulations for certain “criteria pollutants” 
that are deemed a “danger to human health and welfare.”
32
  Pursuant 
to this final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the EPA 
will regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles and new motor 
vehicle engines under the CAA.
33
  Such regulations have already been 
adopted for light-duty vehicles,
34
 and regulations have also been pro-
 
 27 Editorial, The Cap and Tax Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2009, at A14 (“Under a 
cap-and-trade system, government sets a cap on the total amount of carbon that can 
be emitted nationally; companies then buy or sell permits to emit CO2. The cap gets 
cranked down over time to reduce total carbon emissions.”).   
 28 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  
 29 See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Next Year Offers Little Cheer for Those Battling Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/27/ 
business/energy-environment/27green.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=cap%20and%20 
trade&st=cse. 
 30 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 31 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 32 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2006); id. § 7521(a)(1). 
 33 See Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 
49,454 (proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. 
pts. 531, 533, 537, 538). 
 34 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Av-
erage Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).  “Light-duty 
vehicles” refer to passenger cars and light trucks including, among others, minivans, 
passenger vans, pickup trucks, and sport-utility vehicles.  Emission Standards Reference 
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posed for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.
35
  Similarly, the EPA is al-
so seeking to regulate the GHG emissions from large stationary 
sources pursuant to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(PSD) program and Title V of the CAA.
36
  These sections of the CAA 
set up a permitting program for stationary sources during the pre-
construction phase and operational phase, respectively.
37
 
Although the Second Circuit clearly held in AEP that no federal 
statutory scheme displaced federal public-nuisance claims at the time 
that case was decided, the court did indicate that future displace-
ment
38
 of federal global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions was poss-
ible through administrative rulemaking.
39
  Therefore, we are pre-
sented with the question of whether regulation of GHGs under the 
CAA would displace the federal common law of public nuisance for 
claims seeking relief for the effects of global climate change and, if 
so, what the scope of this displacement would look like. 
Part II of this Comment will briefly outline the law of public 
nuisance and the development of displacement jurisprudence.  It will 
also summarize key aspects of the CAA, including the ways in which 
the Act treats stationary, mobile, and fuel sources.  Part III will ex-
plain the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the 
“light-duty vehicle” rule, and the “tailoring” rule.  Part IV will ex-
 
Guide: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/ 
standards/basicinfo.htm#1 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).   
 35 See Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines 
and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068). 
 36 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 
71).  Although the EPA is not currently seeking to regulate stationary sources 
through the adoption of an endangerment finding under § 108 of the CAA and sub-
sequent administrative rulemakings, the EPA considers the regulation of GHGs un-
der the “light-duty vehicle” rule as triggering the PSD and Title V permitting pro-
grams.  See discussion infra note 173. 
 37 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7515, 7661–7661f (2006). 
 38 Displacement is often confused with pre-emption, but pre-emption is a subs-
tantively different concept.  See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 
371 n.37 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981)), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174); Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. 
Cnty. of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 530 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on oth-
er grounds, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 39 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 392–93 (“‘It may happen that new federal 
laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law 
of nuisance.  But until that comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to ap-
praise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance’ by greenhouse 
gases.” (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 
106 (1971))). 
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amine what the contours of federal displacement should look like 
with these rulemakings officially adopted.  Lastly, Part V will briefly 
posit what the consequences of this possible displacement scheme 
may be in regard to federal action in both the legislative and execu-
tive branches, as well as opine on what the best future course of ac-
tion is moving forward. 
II. THE LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE, DISPLACEMENT,  
AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
A. Public Nuisance 
Although the tort of public nuisance was originally considered a 
crime, a cause of action for public nuisance serves only as a basis for 
civil liability in modern jurisprudence.
40
  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with 
a right common to the general public.”
41
  This definition, which a ma-
jority of states have adopted, has also been used in the context of fed-
eral common law.
42
  In fact, the court in AEP explicitly adopted the 
Restatement standard for public nuisance when discussing whether the 
plaintiffs had pled a valid cause of action.
43
 
Generally, a public nuisance is an interference with rights com-
mon to the general public such as public health, safety, morals, 
peace, comfort, or convenience.
44
  The Restatement also provides that 
interference with a public right is unreasonable if “the conduct is 
proscribed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation, 
or . . . is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or 
long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has 
a significant effect upon the public right.”
45
 
 
 40 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 495 (N.J. 2007) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. c (1979)).   
 41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B. 
 42 See, e.g., Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F. 2d 1222, 1234 
(3d. Cir. 1980), vacated, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).  In National Sea Clammers Ass’n, Plaintiffs, 
fisherman who fished the waters off the coast of New York and New Jersey, brought a 
claim against defendants in federal public nuisance for discharging or permitting the 
discharge of “nutrient-rich sewage and toxic wastes into the Atlantic Ocean or its tri-
butaries.”  Id. at 1224.  Although the Supreme Court later vacated this decision be-
cause it determined that Plaintiffs’ federal public nuisance claims were displaced, the 
circuit court adopted the Restatement definition of public nuisance in the context of 
federal common law while holding in favor of the Plaintiffs.  See id. at 1234. 
 43 See Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 350–52. 
 44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a). 
 45 § 821B(2)(b), (c). 
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Not all would-be plaintiffs have standing to bring a claim against 
a defendant in tort for a public nuisance.  In most instances, only a 
state (or a state’s agent) or other public entity, such as a city, can in-
itiate a claim for public nuisance, but individuals have standing in 
such cases if they can prove a “special” damage.
46
  Thus, for individu-
als to plead a valid cause of action for public nuisance, they “must 
have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other 
members of the public exercising the right common to the general 
public that was the subject of interference.”
47
  On this basis, private 
land trusts have initiated federal-nuisance actions seeking damages 
and injunctive relief from emitters of GHGs.
48
  States and other gov-
ernment entities have initiated similar public-nuisance actions in 
their representative capacity for the general public.
49
  Because air pol-
lution is partially regulated by the federal government, the question 
becomes whether plaintiffs in global-warming-as-public-nuisance ac-
tions still have a viable cause of action.  Put another way, the issue is 
whether the federal common law of public nuisance is displaced by 
federal statutory and regulatory law in the context of GHG emissions. 
B. Displacement 
As an initial matter, “the concept of ‘displacement’ refers to a 
situation in which ‘federal statutory law governs a question previously 
the subject of federal common law.’”
50
  On the other hand, “pre-
emption” refers to “a circumstance in which a federal statute super-
sedes state law.”
51
 In the words of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
“determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously 
the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed 
in deciding if federal common law pre-empts state law.”
52
  Courts, 
however, often confuse these doctrines and use them interchangea-
 
 46 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 497–98 (N.J. 2007) (citing Poulos 
v. Dover Boiler & Plate Fabricators, 76 A.2d 808, 811–12 (N.J. 1950)). 
 47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1). 
 48 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005), rev’d, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) 
(No. 10-174). 
 49 See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 
(N.D. Cal. 2009); California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007); Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 50 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 371 n.37 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981)), cert. granted, 
131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316. 
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bly.
53
  All but one of the public-nuisance actions seeking relief for the 
effects of global warming that have been filed to date have been 
based on federal common law.  The exception was Comer, where the 
plaintiffs’ suit was based on, among other claims, state private and 
public nuisance causes of action.
54
 
Federal common law is recognized only when state common law 
is inadequate to deal with the issue presented.  As the United States 
Supreme Court has stated, “If state law can be applied, there is no 
need for federal common law; if federal common law exists, it is be-
cause state law cannot be used.”
55
  Thus, federal and state common 
law are mutually exclusive—where state common law is sufficient, 
federal common law cannot be applied.  In the air pollution context, 
“[i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that 
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale . . . .” 
56
  State law is insufficient to address these concerns because states, in 
their sovereign capacity, would be seeking to enforce a cause of ac-
tion outside their respective jurisdictions.  With this in mind, courts 
recognize federal common law when they are “compelled to consider 
federal questions ‘which cannot be answered from federal statutes 
alone.’”
57
  Therefore, in the context of air pollution, if a state brings a 
cause of action in its sovereign capacity seeking redress for the emis-
sion of air pollution, the federal common law should apply unless 
federal statutory or regulatory law has displaced it. 
The power of courts to recognize federal common law “is subject 
to the paramount authority of Congress.”
58
  Therefore, the legislative 
branch may limit the courts’ ability to recognize federal common law.  
This is because concerns over separation of powers prevent the courts 
from determining what constitutes reasonableness when Congress 
 
 53 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 371 n.37 (“[C]ourts have also frequently used 
the word ‘pre-emption’ when discussing whether a statute displaces federal common 
law.” (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317 n.9; Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. 
of Oneida, 719 F.2d 525, 530 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 470 U.S. 226 (1985))). 
 54 Although state public-nuisance claims were at issue in Comer, all other global-
warming-as-public-nuisance actions have been brought under federal common law.  
As such, only federal common law and displacement jurisprudence will be discussed 
in this Comment.  
 55 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 n.7. 
 56 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).   
 57 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314 (quoting D’Oench Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 
U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 58 Id. at 313–14 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted). 
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has already spoken on the issue.
59
  In determining whether statutory 
law has displaced federal common law, the main inquiry is whether 
the problem presented to the court—previously governed by the 
common law—has been sufficiently addressed in the legislation.
60
  
Federal common law applies until the point at which “the field has 
been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized ad-
ministrative standards.”
61
 
Unlike when determining whether an act of Congress has pre-
empted state law, “evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not re-
quired” when determining whether federal legislation or administra-
tive action has displaced federal common law.
62
  This is because dis-
placement does not raise the issues of federalism present in a pre-
emption analysis.
63
  Beyond the foregoing, a “presumption favoring 
retention of existing law”
64
 still applies, and “courts may take it as a 
 
 59 Id. at 315 (“Our ‘commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental’ 
to continue to rely on federal common law ‘by judicially decreeing what accords with 
common sense and the public weal’ when Congress has addressed the problem.” 
(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978))). 
 60 Id. at 315 n.8 (“[T]he question whether a previously available federal common-
law action has been displaced by federal statutory law involves an assessment of the 
scope of the legislation and whether the scheme established by Congress addresses 
the problem formerly governed by federal common law.”).  The Supreme Court has 
also held that “an agency regulation with the force of law can pre-empt conflicting 
state” law.  Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (citing Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).  In such cases, a court should “perform[] its own conflict 
determination.”  Id.  Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether agency 
regulation may displace federal common law, it stands to reason that agency regula-
tion having the force of law should be given displacement effect when it “speaks di-
rectly” to the issue governed by the federal common law.  Compare Connecticut v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 381 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding global-warming-as-
public-nuisance actions were not displaced because GHGs were not regulated under 
the CAA at the time of the decision), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 
10-174), with New Eng. Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that the CAA precluded the issuance of an injunction under federal common law 
when the pollutant at issue was currently regulated under the Act). 
 61 Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).  In 
Pankey, the State of Texas sued eight owners and operators of ranch land in New 
Mexico for their use of Toxaphene, a pesticide.  Id. at 237.  Plaintiffs argued that use 
of this pesticide interfered with its citizens’ right to make use of the Canadian River, 
which runs from New Mexico into Texas, by polluting this water.  Id. at 237–38.  The 
court held that the plaintiffs had a right to a federal common law cause of action in 
public nuisance.  Id. at 241–42.    
 62 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 316–17. 
 63 Id. (“[Federalism] concerns are not implicated in the same fashion when the 
question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and according-
ly the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required.”). 
 64 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). 
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given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the 
[common law] principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose 
to the contrary is evident.’”
65
  The ultimate question in a displace-
ment analysis, however, is whether the legislative scheme has “spoken 
directly to the question.”
66
  Further, all that matters is that the field is 
occupied, “not whether it has been occupied in a particular man-
ner.”
67
  In other words, the only question in determining whether 
federal statutory law displaces federal common law is whether the is-
sue has been addressed in some manner.  Whether the matter has 
been addressed to the courts’ or the plaintiffs’ liking is of no con-
cern.  The Supreme Court has noted, for example, that “speaking di-
rectly” to the question at issue may, in some cases, require that the 
“question” be as specific as a question of what damages are appropri-
ate.
68
  Federal common law can therefore exist only as a gap-filling 
measure in areas that the legislative or regulatory scheme has not 
previously addressed.
69
 
In the landmark case Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), the Su-
preme Court held that the City of Milwaukee had a valid cause of ac-
tion in federal public nuisance against the State of Illinois for its pol-
lution of interstate waters.
70
  Eventually, this case again worked its way 
up to the Supreme Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II).
71
  In 
the interim, however, Congress had passed the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972.
72
  This set the stage 
for the Court to determine whether these amendments displaced the 
federal common law in the area of water pollution.  The Supreme 
Court concluded in Milwaukee II that Congress had “occupied the 
field” of federal public nuisance law in the context of water pollution 
“through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program 
[i.e., the FWPCA] supervised by an expert administrative agency” and 
thus, the federal common law was displaced.
73
  As the Court noted, at 
 
 65 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting 
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). 
 66 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315. 
 67 Id. at 324. 
 68 Id. at 315 (noting that the federal statute at issue in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), spoke to “the question of damages”). 
 69 See id. at 324 n.18. 
 70 Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I), 406 U.S. 91, 108 (1972). 
 71 451 U.S. 304. 
 72 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (2006)); Milwau-
kee II, 451 U.S. at 310. 
 73 Id. at 317. 
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the time of Milwaukee I, the FWPCA was merely “another law touching 
interstate waters,” but the subsequent amendments “spoke directly” 
to the issue by the time of Milwaukee II by creating a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme.
74
  The Second Circuit has stated the rule ex-
pressed in Milwaukee II as 
a strict test for determining the [displacement] effect of a federal 
statute.  Instead of inquiring whether ‘Congress ha[s] affirmative-
ly proscribed the use of federal common law,’ we are to conclude 
that federal common law has been [displaced] as to every ques-
tion to which the legislative scheme ‘spoke directly,’ and every 
problem that Congress has ‘addressed.’
75
 
No Supreme Court case has ever held that the CAA displaces 
federal common law in regard to air pollution; nor has the Court ad-
dressed this issue.  Two district courts, however, have held that the 
CAA displaces the federal common law in this area.
76
  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in AEP—the only circuit court opinion to 
address the displacement effect of the CAA on global-warming-as-
public-nuisance claims
77
—explicitly rejected the conclusion of the two 
district courts and criticized one court’s analysis for “equating the 
CAA with the [FWPCA]—without further analyzing the two sta-
tutes.”
78
  In an earlier case, the Second Circuit held that the CAA 
precluded the issuance of an injunction under federal common law, 
but this was only in regard to a pollutant currently regulated under 
the act.
79
  This was a narrow holding.  The court did “not reach the 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Milwaukee 
II, 451 U.S. at 315). 
 76 See Reeger v. Mill Serv. Inc., 593 F. Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1984); United 
States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982). 
 77 The Fifth Circuit in Comer did not address the issue of displacement, and in-
stead, the court focused its analysis on the issues of standing and the political ques-
tion doctrine.  See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g 
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).  
Further, the plaintiffs in Comer brought a cause of action for public nuisance under 
state common law and therefore this would evoke a pre-emption, as opposed to a dis-
placement, analysis.  See id. (“The plaintiffs invoked the district court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.  The plaintiffs do not assert any federal 
or public law actions and do not seek injunctive relief.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 78 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 378 n.47 (2d Cir. 2009) (cri-
ticizing the court’s analysis in Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 
813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 79 New Eng. Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981).   The Second 
Circuit, in Costle, determined that the plaintiffs had not pled a valid cause of action 
seeking an injunction against defendants, Long Island Lighting Company, from 
burning oil that contained sulphur.  Id. at 33.  The court reasoned that EPA’s ap-
proval of a State Implementation Plan (SIP) that included Long Island Lighting 
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broad question of whether the Clean Air Act totally [displaces] feder-
al common law nuisance actions based on emission of chemical pol-
lutants in the air.”
80
  In AEP, however, the Second Circuit found the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA helpful to its analy-
sis of the displacement issue.
81
 
The first question on the merits that the Court faced in Massa-
chusetts was “whether § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act authorizes 
[the] EPA to regulate [GHG] emissions from new motor vehicles in 
the event that it forms a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to 
climate change.”
82
  The EPA argued that carbon dioxide is not an “air 
pollutant” within the meaning of the CAA and therefore it had no ju-
risdiction over its regulation.
83
  The Court reasoned, however, that 
the statute is unambiguous and embraces all airborne compounds.
84
  
Thus, the Court concluded that the EPA has authority to regulate 
GHGs under the CAA.
85
  This holding indicated to the Second Circuit 
that the CAA requires regulation of GHGs only when the EPA has de-
cided that emission of GHGs presents a danger to human health and 
welfare and does not, of necessity, speak to the question of GHG emis-
sions a priori.
86
  The CAA, therefore, authorizes the EPA to regulate 
GHGs, but at the time AEP was decided no such regulations were in 
effect.  The proposed regulations were just that, merely proposed.  
The CAA, along with its then-current regulations, did not speak to 
the issue of GHG emissions and thus did not displace federal public 
nuisance claims for the effects of global warming.
87
  Such displace-
ment, however, may occur at some future date.
88
  Ultimately, the 
court determined that the CAA (absent an endangerment finding as 
to, and other regulation concerning, GHGs) was more akin to the 
state of the FWPCA at the time Milwaukee I was decided, as opposed 
 
Company’s use of the high-sulfur fuel precluded plaintiffs from maintaining a com-
mon law cause of action.  Id. at 32–33.  
 80 Id. at 32. 
 81 Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 378–80. 
 82 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). 
 83 Id. at 511–12. 
 84 Id. at 528–29; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). 
 85 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 86 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 379 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 87 See id. at 379–81. 
 88 Id. (“We cannot say, therefore, that EPA’s issuance of proposed findings suffice 
to regulate greenhouse gases in a way that ‘speaks directly’ to Plaintiffs’ problems 
and thereby displaces Plaintiffs’ existing remedies under the federal common law.” 
(citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319–24 (1981))). 
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to the version of the FWPCA in place at the time of Milwaukee II, and 
therefore did not displace the federal common law.
89
  The emphasis 
placed on the possibility of the CAA’s displacement capacity in regard 
to global-warming-as-public-nuisance claims requires further consid-
eration of the scope and structure of the CAA to determine the con-
tours of what this displacement may be. 
C. The Clean Air Act 
Congress enacted the CAA in 1955,
90
 and the Act has since been 
amended on several occasions.
91
  The purpose of the CAA is to, 
among other things, “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s 
air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the 
productive capacity of its population.”
92
  The CAA generally treats sta-
tionary and mobile sources, as well as fuel content, differently.  
“Broadly speaking, Title I of the statute regulates stationary sources of 
pollution and Title II regulates [fuel content and] mobile sources, 
most importantly motor vehicles.”
93
 
1. Stationary Sources 
Under the present framework of the CAA, in regulating statio-
nary sources, the Administrator of the EPA is required to identify 
“criteria” air pollutants that are reasonably anticipated to “endanger 
public health or welfare.”
94
  Additionally, the EPA must find that “the 
presence of [the criteria pollutant] in the ambient air results from 
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources.”
95
  This is called an 
endangerment finding.  Stationary sources are “generally any source 
of an air pollutant except those emissions resulting directly from an 
internal combustion engine for transportation purposes or from a 
nonroad engine or nonroad vehicle.”
96
  Once a criteria pollutant has 
 
 89 Id. at 380. 
 90 See Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322. 
 91 See Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392; Pub. L. No. 89-272, Title I, § 101(2), 
(3), 79 Stat. 992; Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485; Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title I, § 
108(k), 104 Stat. 2468; see also Clean Air Act: History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/caa_history.html (last visited Dec. 30, 
2010).  
 92 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006). 
 93 Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d 462, 464 (1st Cir. 1993); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–
7513a (Title I), 7521–7590 (Title II) (2006).  
 94 § 7408(a)(1)(A). 
 95 § 7408(a)(1)(B). 
 96 Id. § 7602(z).  The sources excepted from the definition of “stationary source” 
are instead regulated under Title II of the CAA.  See id. §§ 7521–7544. 
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been identified pursuant to an endangerment finding, the Adminis-
trator must then promulgate a primary and secondary National Am-
bient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for that criteria pollutant.
97
  The 
EPA establishes NAAQSs based on the permissible concentration of 
each criteria pollutant in the ambient air measured by “parts per mil-
lion (ppm) by volume, milligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m3), 
and micrograms per cubic meter of air (μg/m3).”98  The Administra-
tor is then required to review these NAAQSs at least once every five 
years.
99
  Primary NAAQSs must allow for an “adequate margin of safe-
ty” necessary to protect the public health.
100
  Secondary NAAQSs must 
“protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse ef-
fects associated with the presence of such air pollutants in the am-
bient air.”
101
 
After NAAQSs are established for criteria pollutants, states—
through a cooperative federalism framework—must submit “a plan 
which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement 
of such . . . standards in each air quality control region (or portion 
thereof).”
102
  These are known as State Implementation Plans (SIPs).  
The Administrator of the EPA then either accepts the SIP
103
 or must 
promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) if the SIP is re-
jected.
104
  A FIP is meant to accomplish the goals of a SIP, but it is in-
stead promulgated by the EPA as opposed to being promulgated by 
the state itself.
105
  In addition to establishing the framework of SIPs, 
the CAA also regulates stationary sources by establishing a program 
for both pre-construction and operating permits.
106
  Pre-construction 
 
 97 § 7409(a)(2).  Primary NAAQS are meant to address dangers directly to hu-
man health, such as the possibility of disease by exposure to these pollutants.  See 40 
C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (2010).  Secondary NAAQS, on the other hand, deal with matters of 
human welfare, which means protection “from any known or anticipated adverse ef-
fects of a pollutant.”  Id.  The EPA generally only issues one NAAQS, however, which 
is meant to satisfy both the primary and secondary NAAQSs.  See, e.g., id. § 50.12. 
 98 Air and Radiation: National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://epa.gov/air/criteria.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). 
 99 § 7409(d)(1). 
 100 § 7409(b)(1). 
 101 § 7409(b)(2).   
 102 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2006).  Air quality control regions consist of the area 
within a state—possibly divided into two or more separate regions—that states must 
consider for purposes of developing and carrying out SIPs.  See id. §7407. 
 103 See id. § 7410(a)(3)(B). 
 104 § 7410(c)(1). 
 105 See § 7410(c). 
 106 See id. §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a, 7661–7661f; see also discussion 
infra Part II.C.1.a–b. 
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permits are further divided into two separate categories based on 
whether the air quality control region in which the source is located 
has reached attainment levels.
107
  Combined, these pre-construction 
programs are called New Source Review (NSR).
108
 
a. Pre-Construction Permits: Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Nonattainment New Source Review 
After establishing NAAQSs, the CAA promulgates two separate 
pre-construction permitting programs.  The first, called the Preven-
tion of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, applies to new ma-
jor stationary sources and “major modifications” to existing major sta-
tionary sources found within attainment areas (i.e., areas that have 
met the NAAQSs on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis).
109
  Determining 
whether the PSD program is applicable to a particular emitter of pol-
lution requires an inquiry into “whether the proposed project is suffi-
ciently large (in terms of its emissions) to be a major stationary 
source or major modification.”
110
  Major stationary sources are those 
that emit at least one hundred tons per year (tpy) of any pollutant 
“subject to regulation” by the CAA for a list of twenty-eight source 
categories
111
 or, alternatively, any source that emits two hundred fifty 
tpy of any pollutant from any other unlisted source.
112
  Major modifi-
 
 107 See §§ 7470–7492, 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a. 
 108 See 40 C.F.R. § 51 app. W(1.0)(a) (2010) (describing prevention of significant 
deterioration as part of new source review). 
 109 §§ 7470–7492.  
 110 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,297 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 111 These sources include  
fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants of more than two hundred and fif-
ty million British thermal units per hour heat input, coal cleaning 
plants (thermal dryers), kraft pulp mills, Portland Cement plants, pri-
mary zinc smelters, iron and steel mill plants, primary aluminum ore 
reduction plants, primary copper smelters, municipal incinerators ca-
pable of charging more than fifty tons of refuse per day, hydrofluoric, 
sulfuric, and nitric acid plants, petroleum refineries, lime plants, phos-
phate rock processing plants, coke oven batteries, sulfur recovery 
plants, carbon black plants (furnace process), primary lead smelters, 
fuel conversion plants, sintering plants, secondary metal production fa-
cilities, chemical process plants, fossil-fuel boilers of more than two 
hundred and fifty million British thermal units per hour heat input, 
petroleum storage and transfer facilities with a capacity exceeding 
three hundred thousand barrels, taconite ore processing facilities, glass 
fiber processing plants, charcoal production facilities.  
§ 7479(1). 
 112 Id. 
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cations, on the other hand, refer to any major physical changes that 
result in an increase in emissions that is “significant” (i.e., equal to or 
above the “significance” level as defined by the EPA).
113
 
Recently, a debate has arisen over the interpretation of the 
words “subject to regulation” under the CAA.  Some have argued that 
these words are synonymous with simply being subject to the moni-
toring and reporting requirements of the Act (which includes a much 
broader spectrum of pollutants) while others have argued that this 
phrase applies to those pollutants whose emissions are subject to con-
trol under other sections of the CAA (i.e., whose emission levels are 
regulated).
114
  The Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) in In re Dese-
ret Power Electric Cooperative rejected an argument by the EPA, region 
8, that historic precedent bound its interpretation of “subject to regu-
lation” to mean that only those pollutants already subject to control 
over emissions by other sections of the CAA are subject to the PSD 
program.
115
  The EAB, however, also rejected the argument that the 
words “subject to regulation” require the application of the PSD pro-
gram to any source subject to monitoring and reporting require-
ments.
116
  Following this case, the EPA Administrator at that time, 
Stephen Johnson, issued a memorandum interpreting “subject to 
regulation” to mean “subject to either a provision in the CAA or regu-
lation adopted by EPA under the CAA that requires actual control of 
emissions of that pollutant.”
117
  The EPA has since reconsidered this 
interpretation, but in early 2010 the EPA made clear that it agrees 
with its initial analysis that the words “subject to regulation” should 
be synonymous with actual control of emissions under the Act.
118
 
 
 113 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(iv)(a) (2010).   
 114 See In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., No. 07-03, 2008 EPA App. LEXIS 47, at *1–
3 (2008). 
 115 Id. at *5–6; see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD): Reconsidera-
tion of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by the Fed-
eral PSD Permit Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,535, 51,538 (Oct. 7, 2009).  
 116 In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., 2008 EPA App. LEXIS 47, at *4–5; see also Pre-
vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD): Reconsideration of Interpretation of 
Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by the Federal PSD Permit Program, 
74 Fed. Reg. at 51,538. 
 117 Memorandum from Stephen Johnson, Envtl. Prot. Agency Adm’r, to Envtl. 
Prot. Agency Reg’l Adm’rs 1 (Dec. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf; see also 
Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Construction Permit 
Program; Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by the 
Federal PSD Permit Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 80,300 (Dec. 31, 2008) (public notice of 
Dec. 18, 2008 memo). 
 118 See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants 
Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2, 
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Once it is determined that the PSD program applies to a particu-
lar source, to obtain a pre-construction permit, the regulated source 
must agree to construct the Best Available Control Technology 
(BACT) and make use of such technology once construction is com-
plete.
119
  What is considered to be the BACT is determined on a case-
by-case basis.
120
  Additionally, a source regulated by the PSD program 
is required to refrain from causing or contributing to pollution that 
results in levels prohibited by the CAA (i.e., results in nonattainment 
for the region on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis).
121
 
The second pre-construction permitting program, called nonat-
tainment NSR, is found in Part D of the CAA and governs sources 
within nonattainment areas (i.e., areas that have not met the 
NAAQSs).
122
  Because GHGs are not currently regulated under Title I 
of the CAA (nor is regulation under Title I currently proposed), and 
thus, no NAAQSs are being proposed for GHGs, all areas in the 
country are therefore in attainment.
123
  Accordingly, the nonattain-
ment NSR program is irrelevant to this discussion. 
b. Title V Operating Permits 
Beyond the pre-construction permits under the PSD and nonat-
tainment NSR programs, Title V of the CAA sets out the overarching 
permitting process for all stationary sources once a stationary source 
becomes operational.
124
  Generally, the Title V program applies to 
major stationary sources, defined as those that emit one-hundred tpy 
of any pollutant, ten tpy of any “hazardous” pollutant, or twenty-five 
 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 51, 70, 71) (“After considering comments 
on alternate interpretations of [the term ‘subject to regulation’], EPA has decided to 
continue to interpret it to include each pollutant subject to either a provision in the 
CAA or regulation adopted by EPA under the CAA that requires actual control of 
emissions of that pollutant.”). 
 119 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006). 
 120 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (describing the “top-down” approach taken by the EPA, in 
which all available control technologies are identified, technically infeasible options 
are eliminated, and a decision is then made from the remaining sources based on 
control and cost effectiveness); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (2010). 
 121 § 7475(a)(3). 
 122 Id. §§ 7501–7509a, 7511–7513a. 
 123 Perhaps more accurately, the attainment/nonattainment distinction simply 
does not apply, but this difference is merely one of semantics for the purposes of this 
discussion.  What is important to understand is that the nonattainment NSR permit-
ting program is not implicated by any of the proposed regulations concerning GHG 
emissions. 
 124 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661–7661f (2006). 
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tpy of any combination of “hazardous” pollutants.
125
  In addition, Title 
V regulation applies to any affected source subject to the acid rain 
sections of the CAA, any source requiring a permit under the PSD or 
nonattainment NSR program, or any other source designated by 
rule.
126
  The substantive requirements for stationary sources under the 
CAA are found within the NAAQSs and the emission control tech-
nology requirements of the pre-construction permits.
127
  The permit-
ting program of Title V serves merely as a means of enforcement.
128
  
According to the EPA: “Title V generally does not add new substan-
tive requirements for pollution control, but it does require that each 
permit contain all of a facility’s ‘applicable requirements’ under the 
CAA, and that certain procedural requirements be followed, especial-
ly with respect to compliance with these requirements.”
129
  Without a 
permit, a source emitting a criteria pollutant above levels triggering 
application of Title V may not be in operation.
130
 
2. Mobile Sources 
Mobile sources, as defined under the CAA, include “any class or 
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”
131
  To 
regulate mobile sources under the CAA, the Administrator of the 
EPA must make a finding that an “air pollutant from any class or 
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in 
his [or her] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution . . . may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
132
  
This is called an endangerment and cause or contribute finding.
133
  
Once an endangerment and cause or contribute finding is made by 
the EPA Administrator pursuant to § 202, “[t]he CAA regulates mo-
 
 125 § 7661(2)(A)–(B).  
 126 § 7661a(a).  
 127 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 § 7661a(a). 
 131 Id. § 7521(a)(1). 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,890 (proposed 
Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“Section 202(a) sets forth a two-
part predicate for regulatory action under that provision: endangerment and cause 
or contribute.”). 
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bile sources primarily by requiring standards for tailpipe emissions.”
134
  
Furthermore, “[w]hile states have significant latitude in setting sta-
tionary source emissions limits to meet the NAAQS, the Act reserves 
to the federal government exclusive authority to regulate motor ve-
hicle emissions.”
135
 
3. Fuel and Fuel Additives 
Similar to new motor vehicle and new motor vehicle engine reg-
ulation, the Administrator can regulate fuel and fuel additives 
for use in a motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or nonroad en-
gine or nonroad vehicle 
(A) if in the judgment of the Administrator any emission 
product of such fuel or fuel additives causes, or contributes, 
to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger the public health or welfare, or 
(B) if emission products of such fuel or additive will impair 
to a significant degree the performance or any emission con-
trol device or system.
136
 
Under this provision, the EPA can “prohibit the manufacture, intro-
duction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale” of any such regu-
lated fuel.
137
  Clearly, Congress intended separate means of regulation 
for stationary, mobile, and fuel sources under the CAA.  Stationary 
sources are governed by the establishment of NAAQSs and a permit-
ting program used to enforce such standards, along with require-
ments for the emission control technology used.
138
  Mobile sources, 
on the other hand, are regulated by the adoption of tailpipe-emission 
standards and a prohibition on the sale of those mobile sources 
which do not meet those standards.
139
  Lastly, fuel sources are regu-
lated by prohibiting certain fuel content or additives.
140
 
D. Setting the Stage for New Regulation 
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down its most 
important decision to date concerning the CAA and global climate 
 
 134 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 376 n.45 (2d Cir. 2009) (cit-
ing § 7521), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 135 Id. (citing § 7543). 
 136 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1) (2006). 
 137 Id. 
 138 See supra Part II.C.1.a–b. 
 139 See supra Part II.C.2. 
 140 § 7545(c)(1). 
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change, Massachusetts v. EPA.
141
  Leading up to this case, in October 
1999, nineteen environmental and renewable energy industry organi-
zations filed a rulemaking petition to force the EPA to regulate car-
bon dioxide under the CAA.
142
  When the EPA declined, suit fol-
lowed.
143
  The first issue that the Court had to decide in Massachusetts 
v. EPA was whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue.
144
  The court 
decided that, yes, the plaintiffs did have the requisite standing neces-
sary to challenge the EPA’s denial of its rulemaking petition.
145
  It 
then turned to the merits of the case. 
The first question on the merits that the Court addressed was 
whether § 202(a)(1) of the CAA gives the EPA the authority to regu-
late GHGs from mobile sources if, in the judgment of the Administra-
 
 141 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 142 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,889 (proposed Apr. 
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 143 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510–14. 
 144 Id. at 516–28. 
 145 Id. at 526.  First, the Court stated that the case before it did not raise a political 
question, would not result in an advisory opinion, nor had it been mooted by subse-
quent developments, all of which would have been fatal to the plaintiff’s standing.  
Id. at 516.  Ultimately, the Court determined that the state of Massachusetts had 
standing to sue in its “quasi-sovereign,” or parens patriae, capacity.  Id. at 520 n.17.  
Litigating as parens patriae allows a state to protect “public or governmental interests 
that concern the state as a whole.”  Id. (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. 
MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 289 (5th ed. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Court 
reasoned that plaintiffs could prove an “injury in fact” based on the scientific evi-
dence indicating that global warming would likely raise sea-levels and therefore, the 
state would permanently lose land by inundation, among other negative conse-
quences.  Id. at 521–23.  The majority rebuffed the Chief Justice’s argument in dis-
sent that Massachusetts could not quantify its projected land loss and that therefore 
its submission was “conclusory.”  Id. at 523 n.21.  Instead, the majority countered, the 
likelihood that “Massachusetts’s coastline will recede has nothing to do with whether 
petitioners have documented the precise metes and bounds of their soon-to-be-
flooded land.”  Id.  Next, the Court rejected the EPA’s argument that the necessary 
causation needed to confer standing was lacking.  Id. at 523–25.  The EPA argued 
that “its decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles 
contributes so insignificantly to [Massachusetts’s] injuries that the agency cannot be 
haled into federal court to answer for them.”  Id. at 523.  The Court reasoned that 
the assumption that a small, incremental step can never be attacked in a federal 
court was erroneous because this would “doom most challenges to regulatory action.”  
Id. at 524.  Lastly, the Court concluded that, although the EPA could not reverse 
global warming, this did not mean that there was not sufficient standing for the 
Court to decide “whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”  Id. at 525.  
The EPA’s own actions indicated its belief that it could in fact help slow or reduce 
global climate change.  Id. at 526.  Thus, with all three requirements of standing sa-
tisfied—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—the Court held that plaintiffs 
had the requisite standing to permit a decision on the merits.  Id. 
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tor, such emissions detrimentally affect public health and welfare.
146
  
The EPA argued that carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” within 
the meaning of the CAA.
147
  The Court reasoned, however, that the 
statute was unambiguous and that the plain meaning of the relevant 
CAA provision “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, 
and underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word 
‘any.’”
148
  Under this interpretation, the CAA clearly allows for the 
regulation of GHGs under § 202 of the Act.
149
 
The second question on the merits was whether the EPA’s rea-
son for not regulating GHGs under the CAA—that even if it did have 
statutory authority, regulating GHGs under the CAA would be un-
wise—was a valid use of its discretion.
150
  On this point, the Supreme 
Court held that the EPA “can avoid taking further action only if it de-
termines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change 
or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or 
will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”
151
  
Thus, refusing to regulate GHGs under the CAA because other ex-
ecutive-branch programs already govern global warming, because re-
gulating GHGs under the Act might impair the President’s diplomat-
ic negotiations, or because the approach might be inefficient and 
piece-meal were not valid reasons for failing to regulate.
152
  In other 
words, the Supreme Court mandated that the EPA must either decide 
that GHGs are dangerous to human health and welfare and therefore 
regulate them under the CAA, or it must decide that they are not 
dangerous to human health and welfare and not regulate them un-
der the CAA.  If there is not enough information to determine 
whether GHGs are a danger to human health and welfare, the EPA 
must say so unambiguously.
153
 
 
 146 Id. at 528. 
 147 Id. at 513. 
 148 Id. at 528–29; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006) (“The term ‘air pollutant’ 
means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, 
chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or 
otherwise enters the ambient air.  Such term includes any precursors to the forma-
tion of any air pollutant . . . .”). 
 149 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 150 Id. at 532. 
 151 Id. at 533. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 534. 
Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty 
surrounding various features of climate change and concluding that it 
would therefore be better not to regulate at this time.  If the scientific 
uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a rea-
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The Court was also explicit in stating that it did not reach the 
question of whether the EPA must make an endangerment finding as 
to GHGs under the Act.
154
  Regardless, because of the emerging con-
sensus regarding human-induced global climate change throughout 
the scientific community,
155
 the Court’s decision essentially tied the 
EPA’s hands, making it clear that regulation would soon follow. 
III. A FINAL ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDING, 
THE “LIGHT DUTY VEHICLE” RULE, AND THE “TAILORING” RULE 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
the Administrator of the EPA under President George W. Bush, Ste-
phen Johnson, issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
to seek public comment on how the EPA should respond to this deci-
sion.
156
  Then, in April 2009, Lisa Jackson, the new Administrator of 
the EPA, promulgated a proposed endangerment and cause or con-
tribute finding as to GHGs under the Act.
157
  This rule became final in 
December of 2009.
158
  In addition, the EPA has finalized the adoption 
of tailpipe emission standards for light-duty motor vehicles in accor-
dance with this endangerment and cause or contribute finding.
159
  
 
soned judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global 
warming, EPA must say so. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 154 Id. at 534–35 (“We need not and do not reach the question whether on re-
mand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can in-
form EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.”). 
 155 See supra note 7. 
 156 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 157 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 158 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).  Although this rule has been made final, 
court challenges await.  Sixteen parties have filed suit against the EPA seeking to pre-
vent the EPA’s endangerment and cause or contribute finding from taking effect.  
Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed Against EPA Before Deadline, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/17/17greenwire-16-
endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html. 
 159 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Aver-
age Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).  Proposed 
standards have also been promulgated for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.  See 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Ve-
hicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed November 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R. 
pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068). 
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Furthermore, Administrator Jackson issued additional proposed reg-
ulations pursuant to which the EPA is seeking to regulate large sta-
tionary sources according to a new “tailoring” rule.
160
  In June of 2010, 
this rule became finalized.
161
  The “tailoring” rule restricts the appli-
cation of the PSD and the Title V permitting programs to only those 
stationary sources that omit large amounts of GHGs.
162
  These regula-
tions are important to a displacement analysis because it is possible 
that they “speak directly” to the questions presented by global-
warming-as-public-nuisance claims. 
A. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Finding and the “Light-
Duty” Vehicle Rule 
The final endangerment and cause or contribute finding takes 
action only under § 202 of the CAA.
163
  This is the section of the Act 
that governs mobile sources (i.e., new motor vehicles and new motor 
vehicle engines), and the EPA is not proposing to regulate stationary 
sources or fuel content under this rulemaking.  In the Administra-
tor’s own words, “EPA is not proposing or taking action under any 
other provision of the Clean Air Act” besides under § 202 in this reg-
ulation.
164
 
In this final endangerment and cause or contribute finding, the 
EPA will regulate six different GHGs, which include carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6).
165
  
More specifically, “the Administrator finds that the air pollution is the 
combined mix of six key directly-emitted, long-lived and well-mixed 
greenhouse gases . . . , which together, constitute the root cause of 
human-induced climate change and the resulting impacts on public 
health and welfare.”
166
  Through a definition of air pollution as the 
 
 160 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 161 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
70, 71). 
 162 See infra Part III.B. 
 163 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,888 (proposed Apr. 
24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516–17 
(Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 166 Id. at 66,516 (emphasis added).  
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mixture of these six GHGs, “the Administrator is identifying the fun-
damental and underlying driver of human-induced climate change, 
which, in turn, . . . poses risks to human health, society, and the envi-
ronment.”
167
  According to the court’s interpretation in AEP, the ad-
ministrator was proposing to find (and since the final rulemaking, 
has found) four distinct things: (1) that GHGs endanger human 
health and welfare; (2) that this is caused specifically by the six 
named gases in the proposed rulemaking; (3) that four of these gases 
(CO2, CH4, N2O, and HFCs) are emitted from motor vehicles and 
contribute to the concentration of GHGs in the air; and (4) that 
these emissions from motor vehicles therefore contribute to the en-
dangerment of human health and welfare.
168
 
This final endangerment and cause or contribute finding is only 
the first step in regulating GHG emissions from mobile sources.  Af-
ter the release of the proposed endangerment and cause or contri-
bute finding but prior to the final rule, the EPA, along with the De-
partment of Transportation, issued a joint proposed rulemaking.
169
  
The purpose of this joint rulemaking was, among other things, to set 
emission standards for light-duty vehicles.
170
  In May of 2010, this pro-
posed rulemaking was finalized and given effect.
171
  This rulemaking 
is the final step in regulating GHG emissions for light-duty mobile 
sources.  In November 2010, the EPA released proposed standards 
for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles, although these regulations have 
not been finalized.
172
 
 
 167 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,896. 
 168 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 377 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Sec-
tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,886), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 169 Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sion Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 
(proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600, 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 
533, 537, 538). 
 170 See id. 
 171 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Aver-
age Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).   
 172 Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and 
Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (proposed Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 
85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068). 
GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:16 AM 
2011] COMMENT 697 
B. The “Tailoring” Rule 
The EPA has made clear that it considers promulgation of the 
light-duty vehicle regulations that have since been finalized as trigger-
ing pre-construction NSR and Title V permitting regulations for ma-
jor stationary sources.
173
  Because many sources emit GHGs above the 
level at which NSR and Title V are triggered (one hundred or two 
hundred fifty tpy, depending on the source) but do not emit other 
pollutants at significant levels (and therefore are not otherwise sub-
ject to the permitting scheme), many small sources would be newly 
burdened by regulation of GHGs under the CAA.
174
  Recognizing that 
this would result in a large influx of  new sources coming under the 
permitting regulation of the CAA that are not currently subject to this 
section of the Act’s reach, the EPA proposed a “tailoring” rule.
175
 
Pursuant to the “tailoring” rule, the emission levels at which the 
PSD and Title V permitting schemes become applicable to stationary 
sources for their emission of GHGs is increased.
176
  The EPA has 
adopted a two-step approach to phase in certain sources.  During the 
first phase, the applicability threshold for both PSD and Title V regu-
lation of GHGs is set at 75,000 tpy on a CO2-equivalent (“CO2e”)
177
 ba-
sis, “but only if the project also significantly increases emissions of at 
 
 173 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,300 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (“[A]s soon as GHGs become regulated under the light-
duty motor vehicle rule, GHG emissions will be considered pollutants ‘subject to 
regulation’ under the CAA and will becomes subject to PSD and title V require-
ments.”).  This is a result of the EPA’s interpretation of the words “subject to regula-
tion,” discussed supra Part II.C.1.a.  By defining “subject to regulation” to mean any 
control over emission levels, the light-duty vehicle regulation triggers the PSD pro-
gram.  Also as discussed supra Part II.C.1.a, only PSD, and not nonattainment NSR, is 
triggered for pre-construction permits because no endangerment finding has been 
promulgated pursuant to § 108 of the CAA and therefore all sources are, by necessi-
ty, in attainment.  
 174 See id. at 55,294. 
 175 See id. (recognizing that “many small sources would be burdened by the costs 
of individualized PSD control technology requirements and permit applications” and 
that this would “paralyze” state permitting authorities by “vastly exceed[ing] the cur-
rent administrative resources of the permitting authorities”). 
 176 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 
52, 70, 71). 
 177 All GHGs are scored according to their potential warming effect on global 
temperature.  See Clean Energy: Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/calculator.html 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2010).  Carbon dioxide (CO2) is used as a baseline measure and 
therefore this standard is referred to as a pollutant’s CO2-equivalent.  See id. 
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least one non-GHG pollutant.”
178
  The second phase begins on July 1, 
2011, and during this phase, the applicability threshold is set at 
100,000 tpy for all stationary sources regardless of whether the source 
emits other non-GHG pollutants.
179
  Further, the PSD “significance” 
level is proposed to be set at 750,000 tpy CO2e.
180
  This rule affects on-
ly the applicability threshold for GHGs and not other gases currently 
regulated under the CAA.  Under the “tailoring” rule, the EPA is re-
quired to revisit these levels within five years in order to reevaluate 
their viability, along with the viability of streamlining techniques de-
veloped to better process permitting requirements.
181
  The EPA claims 
to have the authority to promulgate this regulation based on the sta-
tutory text of the CAA,
182
 which states in relevant part that the Admin-
istrator may “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out 
his functions under [the CAA].”
183
  The EPA also relies on the legal 
doctrines of “absurd results” and “administrative necessity” to justify 
its promulgation of the “tailoring” rule.
184
  Although these doctrines 
are rarely used, the EPA believes that regulation of GHGs under the 
CAA presents a viable application of the doctrines.
185
 
The power to promulgate administrative rulemakings pursuant 
to the “absurd results” doctrine is not found in any statutory text.  Ac-
cording to the EPA, courts are reluctant to invoke the “absurd re-
sults” doctrine “because it entails departing from the literal applica-
tion of statutory provisions.”
186
  Generally, under a Chevron analysis, an 
agency (or a court reviewing an agency action) must take a two-step 
approach in its interpretation of statutory text.
187
  First, the court or 
agency must determine whether the plain language of the statutory 
 
 178 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  As discussed supra Part II.C.1.a, “significance” levels are important in de-
termining whether a major stationary source has undertaken a “major modification” 
and therefore becomes subject to the PSD permitting program.  
 181 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 182 Id. 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006).  
 184 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 185 See id. at 31,533. 
 186 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,303 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 187 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
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text is clear; if so, then the agency must follow the plain language.
188
  
Second, if the statutory text is unclear, the agency’s interpretation of 
the statutory text must be “reasonable.”
189
  The “absurd results” doc-
trine, however, allows a deviation from the first step of a Chevron anal-
ysis.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “The plain meaning of legisla-
tion should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the 
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at 
odds with the intentions of its drafters.’  In such cases, the intention 
of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”
190
 
In addition, when applying the “absurd results” doctrine, an 
agency “may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to 
protect congressional intent.”
191
  Due to the large influx of permit ap-
plications that would result without the “tailoring” rule in place, the 
EPA argues that congressional intent would be disrupted.
192
  Specifi-
cally, the EPA argues that it would be impossible to administer the 
permits within twelve months as required by the Act and that this 
would create a backlog that would disrupt administration for years to 
come.
193
  Therefore, the “absurd results” doctrine is applicable to this 
situation. 
Authority to promulgate the “tailoring” rule is also found, ac-
cording to the EPA, in the doctrine of “administrative necessity.”
194
  
This rule is different from the general rule that agencies may take 
administrative factors into consideration when establishing rules be-
cause the “administrative necessity” doctrine involves deviation from 
the statutory text.
195
  The doctrine has largely developed within the 
D.C. Circuit, which stated in its seminal case Alabama Power Co. v. Cos-
tle, 
 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 191 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
 192 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516, 31,533 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 193 Id. 
 194 See id. at 31,543–44. 
 195 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,312 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (“While these cases support the general proposition that 
administrative considerations are important, they differ from the ‘administrative ne-
cessity’ doctrine because in those cases, the Agency’s actions were within the ambit of 
the statutory language; whereas under the ‘administrative necessity’ doctrine, the 
Agency’s actions depart from the statutory language.”). 
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Certain limited grounds for the creation of exemptions are 
inherent in the administrative process, and their unavailability 
under a statutory scheme should not be presumed, save in the 
face of the most unambiguous demonstration of congressional in-
tent to foreclose them. 
. . . 
[There is] substantive authority [for an agency] to take ap-
propriate action to cope with the administrative impossibility of 
applying the commands of the substantive statute.
196
 
Considerations that can be taken into account when deviating from 
the statutory text include the volume and the nature of the task, the 
agency’s financial and personnel resources, and time constraints.
197
  
Demonstrating the applicability of the “administrative necessity” doc-
trine, however, involves a “heavy burden.”
198
  Of particular impor-
tance to the EPA in its argument for the applicability of the doctrine 
was that enforcement of the PSD program was at issue in Alabama 
Power Co.
199
  The court stated, “EPA does have discretion, in adminis-
tering the statute’s ‘modification’ provision, to exempt from PSD re-
view some emission increases on grounds of de minimis or administra-
tive necessity.”
200
 
Under this doctrine, the EPA must make the PSD and Title V 
permitting programs “administratable” by streamlining definitions 
and operative requirements.  The EPA attempts to do this by refining 
the definition of “potential to emit” and by establishing presumptive 
BACTs.
201
  Essentially, under the “tailoring” rule, the EPA is adopting 
the approach that only large emitters of GHGs should come under 
the permitting programs of the CAA and is attempting to exempt sta-
tionary sources that emit only small amounts of GHGs. 
IV. THE DISPLACEMENT SCHEME 
Regulation of GHGs under the CAA would arguably lead to dis-
placement of the federal common law.
202
  At least one commentator 
 
 196 Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 357–59 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 197 Id. at 359. 
 198 Id.  
 199 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,313. 
 200 Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 400. 
 201 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 55,321–24. 
 202 See, e.g., Dan Mensher, Comment, Common Law on Ice: Using Federal Judge-Made 
Nuisance Law to Address the Interstate Effects of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL. L. 
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has also pointed out that the CAA, without an endangerment finding 
officially adopted, does not, on its own, displace the federal common 
law in cases involving GHG emissions.
203
  The Second Circuit in AEP 
seemed acutely aware of this dichotomy in holding that the CAA did 
not presently displace federal common law.
204
  But the court made 
clear that it “expressed no opinion at th[e] time as to whether the ac-
tual regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA by the 
EPA, if and when such regulation should come to pass, would dis-
place [a] cause of action under the federal common law.”
205
  Because 
the EPA’s proposed and final regulations only regulate GHGs under 
certain sections of the CAA, however, the displacement scheme is not 
so simple. 
To “speak directly to the question,” as required to displace fed-
eral public nuisance actions,
206
 several issues must be addressed.  First, 
and most importantly, GHGs must be regulated under the Act.  This 
would require the necessary rulemaking by the EPA under its statuto-
ry authority.  Under the final endangerment and cause or contribute 
finding, “light-duty vehicle” rule, and “tailoring” rule, this does not 
appear to be at issue, as the Administrator is proposing to do just 
that—regulate GHGs under the CAA.  Second, the CAA and its regu-
lations must address the specific source of emissions.  This is a key 
distinction; without guidance as to what sources are to be regulated 
under the CAA, the resulting structure may constitute just “another 
law touching interstate [air pollution]”
207
 akin to the FWPCA in place 
at the time of Milwaukee I (under which the federal common law was 
not displaced) as opposed to the comprehensive regulation govern-
ing at the time of Milwaukee II (which did displace the federal com-
mon law).
208
  Lastly, any regulation of GHGs under the CAA must 
 
463, 484 (2007) (“Were . . . EPA to decide that the CAA did provide for the regula-
tion of GHGs, this regulation would likely displace the common law.”).   
 203 See, e.g., P. Leigh Bausinger, Note, Welcome to the (Impenetrable) Jungle: Massachu-
setts v. EPA, the Clean Air Act and the Common Law of Public Nuisance, 53 VILL. L. REV. 
527, 550–54 (2008). 
 204 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 381 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In 
sum, at least until EPA makes the requisite findings, for purposes of our displacement 
analysis the CAA does not (1) regulate greenhouse gas emissions or (2) regulate such 
emissions from stationary sources.” (emphasis added)), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 
(Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 205 Id. 
 206 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 207 Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981). 
 208 In other words, the difference between the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee I 
and the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee II was that prior to the 1972 Amendments, 
the FWPCA was merely “another law touching interstate water” and was not a com-
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provide some sort of recourse for those injured by a violation of the 
regulation.
209
 
The foregoing requires a displacement analysis to address two 
different concerns.  First, the contours of the regulations and the dif-
ferent treatment of stationary, mobile, and fuel sources under the 
CAA must be addressed.  Second, the difference between equitable 
and legal remedies must be analyzed, specifically in the context of 
remedies for past damages. 
A. Displacement as to Mobile Sources 
The ultimate contours of the regulation of tailpipe emission le-
vels may change an analysis of displacement.  Clearly, however, with 
the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding officially 
adopted and the “light-duty vehicle” rule put into effect, federal 
common law nuisance actions against mobile sources would be dis-
placed. 
Under Title II of the CAA, the EPA may—after making an en-
dangerment and cause and contribute finding—“prescribe . . . stan-
dards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant” from mobile 
sources.
210
  This is exactly what the “light-duty vehicle” rule carries 
out.  Once standards such as the “light-duty vehicle” rule are estab-
lished, the CAA provides a list of prohibitions in accordance with 
those regulations.
211
  For example, manufacturers of new motor ve-
hicles or new motor vehicle engines are prohibited from distributing 
in commerce, selling, offering for sale, or importing into the United 
States any such motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine that does not 
meet the requirements of the regulation.
212
  The CAA goes further 
and provides a list of civil penalties for the violation of provisions un-
der the Act.
213
  The Act gives the Administrator the express authority 
to file civil actions for these violations,
214
 or in lieu of filing a civil ac-
 
prehensive scheme that “spoke directly to the question.”  Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 
317.  If any regulations for GHGs are proposed pursuant to only some sections of the 
CAA, then they may only “touch” GHG regulation and may not speak directly to the 
question at issue.  See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 209 See Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985) (stating 
that the federal statutory scheme did not speak to damages and therefore did not 
displace federal common law). 
 210 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). 
 211 See id. § 7522. 
 212 § 7522(a)(1). 
 213 Id. § 7524(a). 
 214 § 7524(b). 
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tion, the Administrator may assess a civil penalty under the Act.
215
  
Additionally, the CAA provides a citizen-suit provision under which 
any person may bring a civil action against any other person who has 
violated an emission standard under the Act or failed to comply with 
an order issued by “the Administrator or a State with respect to such a 
standard or limitation.”
216
 
Thus, it would seem that any endangerment and cause or con-
tribute finding for GHGs under § 202 of the CAA and subsequent 
emission standards (as in the “light-duty vehicle” rule) would “speak 
directly” to the harm caused by the release of GHG emissions by 
these sources.  Importantly, as the Supreme Court stated, the test is 
“not whether [the field] has been occupied in a particular manner” 
but whether the field has been occupied at all.
217
  Therefore, the fact 
that civil penalties are assessed as opposed to damages (a substantive-
ly different concept) is of no importance.  The fact that these subs-
tantive differences are of little importance in a displacement analysis 
is further emphasized by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
218
  In that case, 
the Supreme Court, faced with a citizen suit under the FWPCA, held 
that “voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily 
does not suffice to moot a case.”
219
  In doing so, the majority argued 
that the appellate court misunderstood civil penalties.
220
  The Court 
stated, 
It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured 
or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing 
at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct 
and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress.  Civil pe-
nalties can fit that description.  To the extent that they encourage 
defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from 
committing future ones, they afford redress to citizen plaintiffs 
who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of 
ongoing unlawful conduct.
221
 
Thus, civil penalties can at times serve as a valid substitute for damag-
es by redressing the identical harm.  Providing statutory damages, 
therefore, is not a necessary prerequisite for a finding of displace-
 
 215 § 7524(c). 
 216 Id. § 7604(a)(1). 
 217 Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 324 (1981). 
 218 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 219 Id. at 174. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 185–86. 
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ment; statutory civil penalties are sufficient to displace the common 
law.  The question of displacement then turns to whether the statuto-
ry language is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all sources. 
In the same way that the FWPCA regulated all point sources and 
thus displaced federal nuisance actions in the water pollution context 
in Milwaukee II, all mobile sources would similarly be regulated under 
the CAA by a requisite endangerment and cause or contribute find-
ing combined with subsequent regulation.  Importantly, the emission 
standards are directly regulated as well, and thus the “issue” of global 
climate change (i.e., the emission of GHGs) is directly spoken to.  
This would seemingly immunize automobile and engine manufactur-
ers from federal public-nuisance claims seeking redress for their con-
tributions to the emission of GHGs.  Nuisance suits, such as that in-
itiated by the Attorney General of California,
222
 against car 
manufacturers would therefore be displaced to the extent that they 
seek injunctive relief or damages for present and future (but not pre-
regulation) harm.
223
 
In California v. GMC, the People of the State of California sued 
six automakers seeking damages for their contribution to global 
warming.
224
  Although the district court dismissed the suit on political-
question grounds, a similar case would likely be dismissed on dis-
placement grounds because tailpipe emission levels are capped pur-
suant to the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding and 
the “light-duty vehicle” rule.  The Attorney General of California may 
have been aware that he would face a battle with respect to displace-
ment.  While this case was pending on appeal, the plaintiff-appellant, 
the People of the State of California, moved to voluntarily dismiss the 
appeal.
225
  The plaintiff proffered two reasons for this voluntary dis-
missal.  Although one reason for voluntarily dismissing the claim was 
that several of the defendant motor companies subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy, the other was that federal action had been taken, includ-
ing the EPA’s acknowledgement that carbon dioxide and other 
GHGs pose a danger to public health and are soon to be regulated.
226
  
This regulation was enough to seemingly satisfy one litigant that suf-
 
 222 California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
27, 2007). 
 223 A suit seeking monetary relief for past damages (i.e., prior to regulation) 
caused by the release of GHGs may not be displaced.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 224 GMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *1. 
 225 Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, California v. GMC, No. 07-16908 (9th 
Cir. filed June 19, 2009). 
 226 Id. 
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ficient action had been taken by the federal government on the issue 
of GHG emissions.  More importantly, however, it is likely to satisfy 
courts that federal legislation and administrative action has spoken 
directly to the issue of global climate change, at least in regard to new 
mobile sources, and therefore federal common law public nuisance 
actions are likely displaced as to those sources because final regula-
tions have been put into place. 
B. Displacement as to Fuel Sources 
A gasoline producer seeking to dismiss a federal public-nuisance 
claim against it for its contribution to global warming on displace-
ment grounds presents a tougher question for the courts.  Under the 
CAA, the EPA has the authority to regulate any fuel or fuel additive.
227
  
Similar to regulation of mobile sources, the CAA prohibits certain ac-
tivities and prescribes civil penalties and injunctive relief for viola-
tions of regulations promulgated for fuel and fuel additives under the 
Act.
228
  Moreover, the content, and thus the resulting emissions, from 
burning that fuel or fuel additive are directly regulated.
229
  Thus, if a 
regulation is promulgated under § 211, the statute would likely 
“speak directly” to questions presented in federal public-nuisance 
claims against fuel companies for their contributions to global warm-
ing.  Again, this would draw on an analogy between point source reg-
ulation under the FWPCA at the time of Milwaukee II and compre-
hensive fuel regulation under the CAA.  Importantly, however, the 
Administrator has not currently proposed regulations under this sec-
tion of the Act. 
Not all courts have recognized the difference between mobile 
source and fuel regulation under the CAA, but this distinction is an 
important one.  The Second Circuit in AEP, for example, seemed to 
ignore the distinction between fuel and mobile source regulation 
when discussing the likely future displacement scheme under the 
proposed endangerment and cause or contribute finding and instead 
focused only on the distinction between stationary and mobile 
sources.
230
  Why the Second Circuit ignored this distinction is unclear, 
 
 227 42 U.S.C. § 7545(a) (2006). 
 228 See § 7545(c)–(d).   
 229 See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Av-
erage Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,396–25,543 (May 
7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38). 
 230 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 376 n.45 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006); § 7545) (stating that mobile sources are regulated 
through both tailpipe emissions standards and regulation of fuel content), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
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but perhaps it was because the defendants in AEP were clearly statio-
nary sources within the meaning of the CAA and the distinction was 
therefore not relevant to the case.  Regardless, what is clear is that 
this distinction could have a significant legal impact on cases such as 
one recently decided in the Northern District of California, Native Vil-
lage of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.
231
 
In Native Village of Kivalina, the Plaintiffs, a Native American In-
upiat tribe and an Alaskan city, sought damages in federal public 
nuisance tort against a number of private fuel companies who they 
claim have contributed to global warming.
232
  Specifically, the plain-
tiffs claim that the “[i]mpacts of global warming have damaged Kiva-
lina to such a grave degree that Kivalina is becoming uninhabitable 
and must now relocate its entire community.”
233
  Because the Admin-
istrator has not sought to regulate fuel and fuel additives directly in 
the context of GHG emissions, at first blush the CAA would appear 
not to displace claims against fuel companies.  An argument can be 
made by fuel companies, however, that the final endangerment and 
cause or contribute finding and subsequent regulation does in fact 
displace federal common law. 
This argument would be based on the fact that fuel must be 
burned, such as in a vehicle engine, in order to emit GHGs into the 
air.  Because of this, fuel companies could argue that regulation of 
tailpipe emissions “speaks directly” to their contribution to global 
warming as well.  In other words, regulating the manner in which fuel 
is burned regulates the way in which it contributes to global climate 
change.  So although the content of fuel is not itself regulated, the 
manner in which it is burned—and thus, the manner in which it con-
tributes to GHG emissions—is.  If a fuel company can frame the de-
bate in this manner, it may be able to prevail in arguing that regula-
tion of tailpipe emissions “speaks directly” to its contribution to 
global warming.  A stronger argument, however, can be made for the 
other side of the issue. 
 
 231 No. 08-1138, 2009 WL 3326113 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). 
 232 Id. at *1. 
 233 Complaint for Damages at ¶ 7, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
No. 08-1138 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 26, 2008).  This case was recently dismissed on 
standing and political question grounds, even though the opinion was handed down 
subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision in AEP.  Native Village of Kivalina v. Ex-
xonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  Thus this case seems 
destined for appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which never had the opportunity to address 
the political question issue in California v. GMC because the appeal in that case was 
voluntarily dismissed.  Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal, California v. GMC, No. 
07-16908 (9th Cir. filed June 19, 2009). 
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A plaintiff is likely to prevail on the displacement issue regard-
less of how the argument is framed.  “To speak ‘directly to the ques-
tion’ and displace federal common law, a federal statute must provide 
some recourse for the problem at issue in the federal common law 
claim.”
234
  Regulation of mobile sources under the CAA does not pro-
vide a means of recourse against fuel sources’ contribution to global 
climate change.  Instead, regulation of mobile sources only provides 
recourse against those mobile sources and does not speak to damages 
that can be linked to the fuel or fuel content.
235
  Several Supreme 
Court cases are on point in this matter.  For example, the Supreme 
Court, in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, held that a federal 
common-law claim for unlawful possession of native lands was not 
displaced because the Nonintercourse Act did “not speak directly to 
the question of remedies.”
236
  Likewise, in United States v. Texas, the 
Supreme Court held that the federal common law right to collect 
prejudgment interest on debts owed to it by the states was not dis-
placed by the Debt Collection Act of 1982 because the Act only pro-
vided for recourse against “people,” which under the express lan-
guage of the Act did not include states.
237
  The CAA, with the final 
endangerment and cause or contribute finding and emission stan-
dards officially adopted, only provides a remedy as against new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines and not against fuel compa-
nies.  Therefore, the CAA would not have a displacement effect as to 
these fuel companies.  Further regulation of fuel content would be 
needed pursuant to § 211 in order to displace the federal common 
law as to producers of fuel. 
C. Displacement as to Stationary Sources 
Under the regulations currently being considered or officially 
adopted by the EPA, stationary sources will be regulated but not to 
the full extent possible pursuant to the statutory text.
238
  Because no 
GHG endangerment finding is being made under § 108 of the CAA, 
the EPA is not required to establish NAAQSs for GHG emissions by 
stationary sources.
239
  In turn, this means that states will not have to 
 
 234 Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 88 (2007). 
 235 See 42 U.S.C. § 7524 (2006). 
 236 Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985). 
 237 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534–35 (1993). 
 238 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 239 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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regulate stationary sources through adoption of a SIP.
240
  Although 
stationary sources will not be regulated in this manner, they do not 
avoid regulation entirely because they will come under the ambit of 
the pre-construction and operating permit requirements of PSD and 
Title V.
241
  These permitting programs, however, will only be applica-
ble to large stationary sources in accordance with the “tailoring” 
rule.
242
 
Initially, worthy of mention is the fact that if the EPA were to 
make an endangerment finding and establish NAAQSs in accordance 
with Title I of the CAA, such regulatory actions would likely displace 
the federal common law for stationary sources.
243
  Both SIPs and FIPs 
provide broad discretion to the requisite authority to regulate statio-
nary sources, and both directly concern pollution levels.
244
  Addition-
ally, once a NAAQS is established, the EPA is required to propose 
New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs), which regulate the 
emission levels for new major stationary sources.
245
  The CAA also 
provides a means of redress in the form of injunctive relief, criminal 
penalties, and civil penalties for violation of NSPSs and SIPs.
246
  Under 
this statutory scheme and accompanying regulation, if enacted, GHG 
regulation would be directly spoken to, and therefore the federal 
common law would be displaced.  This, however, is not being consi-
dered under any of the final or proposed rulemakings.  The regulato-
ry scheme involving the promulgation of NAAQSs and the adoption 
of SIPs is different from the permitting programs of PSD and Title V 
in several ways.  Most importantly, NAAQSs and SIPs regulate the to-
tal emissions released into the ambient air,
247
 while PSD regulates 
emissions only through mandating the technology used by the statio-
nary source.
248
  Title V adds no new substantive component but in-
 
 240 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 241 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 242 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
70, 71). 
 243 The question may arise at which stage in the process will displacement occur; 
would displacement occur immediately upon promulgation of NAAQSs or only once 
a SIP (or FIP) is put into place?  This question, however, is largely academic and 
would be of little concern to a litigant.  Therefore, this question will not be fully ad-
dressed.  
 244 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2006) (providing states with the ability to 
dictate control measures, means, techniques, and time tables). 
 245 Id. § 7411(f). 
 246 Id. § 7413(b)–(d). 
 247 See id. § 7409. 
 248 See id. § 7475(a)(4). 
GRIMM.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/12/2011  9:16 AM 
2011] COMMENT 709 
stead is merely the enforcement mechanism used to ensure stationary 
sources are performing in accordance with the Act.
249
  Therefore, the 
question becomes whether regulation of stationary sources through 
the PSD and Title V permitting programs “speaks directly” to the 
damage caused by emission of GHGs from stationary sources. 
In Milwaukee II, the Supreme Court found especially important 
the fact that “[e]very point source discharge is prohibited [by the 
FWPCA] unless covered by a permit.”
250
  Regulation of stationary 
sources under SIPs would clearly meet this standard and take a com-
prehensive approach by covering all stationary sources.  As one com-
mentator has noted, “A significant indication that Congress has dis-
placed federal common law through comprehensive legislation is the 
presence of an all-encompassing permitting scheme.”
251
  In contrast, 
the permitting programs under PSD and Title V arguably are not suf-
ficiently comprehensive, because they cover only large stationary 
sources in accordance with the “tailoring” rule and do not cover every 
stationary source.  Whether the permitting scheme is sufficiently 
comprehensive, however, is not dispositive. 
Another concept underpinning the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Milwaukee II was that courts should not be allowed to impose addi-
tional burdens on those falling under the jurisdiction of a federal 
act.
252
  In the Court’s words, “[T]here is no basis for a federal court to 
impose more stringent limitations than those imposed under the 
regulatory regime by reference to the federal common law . . . .”
253
  
This possibly weighs in favor of displacement of the federal common 
law of public nuisance by regulation pursuant to the permitting pro-
grams of PSD and Title V for stationary sources.  One could argue 
that Congress and the EPA have established that only large stationary 
sources should be subject to these permitting schemes pursuant to 
the “tailoring” rule and that the BACT is the standard adopted by 
Congress for the PSD program.  Therefore, courts should not be able 
to impose further regulation beyond requiring the adoption of the 
BACT for large stationary sources found in attainment areas.  In oth-
er words, referencing the federal common law to allow small sources 
(i.e., below the threshold established in the “tailoring” rule) to be 
 
 249 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71). 
 250 Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981). 
 251 Alex, supra note 234, at 88. 
 252 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 320. 
 253 Id. 
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sued or to hold the BACT insufficient would amount to impermissi-
ble judicial legislation. 
Using BACT as the standard for GHG emissions in this context, 
however, poses a problem.  A source’s BACT is determined on a case-
by-case basis.
254
  Inherent in this determination then is a certain 
amount of variation in allowable emissions.  It follows, therefore, that 
the judiciary cannot impose more stringent limitations than the CAA 
itself imposes because there is no statutorily mandated emission limi-
tation in the first place.  There is no bright-line emission standard in-
herent in the definition of BACT, and therefore, it is not sufficiently 
precise to prevent the judiciary from making reference to the federal 
common law.  Thus, the federal common law would still be needed as 
a gap-filling measure to address the ultimate issue of GHG emissions 
(i.e., the total amount of emissions); adoption of a specific technolo-
gy would not “speak directly” to this issue. 
Another question to be addressed is what is reasonable in the 
context of GHG emissions.  Like other actions in tort, one of the 
main questions at issue in a public-nuisance action seeking redress 
for the effects of global warming—assuming duty, causation, and 
damages have been established—is the reasonableness of GHG emis-
sions and the remedies that are appropriate if emission levels are 
deemed unreasonable.
255
  The CAA prescribes several remedies for 
violation of PSD and Title V permitting requirements.
256
  Therefore, 
the displacement question then becomes whether Congress or the 
EPA has spoken directly to the issue of reasonableness. 
The first possible source for such a proposition could be the 
EPA’s proposed “tailoring” rule.  Does the level at which the PSD and 
Title V permitting programs become applicable to GHG emissions 
according to the “tailoring” rule constitute a determination by the 
EPA that emissions below that threshold are reasonable?  The EPA’s 
reasoning behind the adoption of the “tailoring” rule is enlightening.  
The EPA indicates that the main reason why it proposed the “tailor-
ing” rule was because it would be administratively infeasible to re-
quire permits for all stationary sources emitting 100 or 250 tpy (de-
 
 254 See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (2010). 
 255 See supra Part II.A; Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315 (noting that the federal statute 
at issue in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), spoke to “the question 
of damages”).   
 256 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c)(1) (providing criminal penalties for “any person who 
knowingly violates” 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2006), among other provisions), 
7413(d)(1)(B) (providing for civil penalties for violation of any permit require-
ment), 7477 (providing for injunctive relief for violation of PSD permit), 7661(i) 
(providing for sanctions for failure to meet Title V permitting requirements) (2006). 
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pending on the source) of GHGs.
257
  Notably, the EPA is silent as to 
whether emissions above 25,000 tpy of GHGs (the minimum annual 
level of emissions in the “tailoring” rule that would trigger the rule’s 
application) are unreasonable.  In fact, the EPA is likely without sta-
tutory authority to make such a determination under the proposed 
“tailoring” rule.  The Administrator, when proposing the “tailoring” 
rule, relied on the legal doctrines of “absurd results” and “administra-
tive necessity.”
258
  These judicial doctrines are predicated on a lack of 
statutory authority.  These doctrines are applied when the adminis-
trative action goes against the plain meaning of the statutory text.  
Thus, in the case of the “tailoring” rule the EPA did not rely on the 
statutory text itself. 
Regardless of whether the EPA has the authority to prescribe the 
reasonableness of PSD and Title V application, it has not done so.  To 
assume that merely applying BACT to these sources—while refraining 
from making an endangerment finding and proposing NAAQSs—is 
equivalent to the EPA insinuating that such emissions are unreasona-
ble is a stretch.  The PSD and Title V permitting programs require 
only the adoption of certain control technology.  Unlike under § 202, 
the EPA is not required to promulgate emission standards under ei-
ther the PSD or Title V permitting programs.  To be sure, the PSD 
permitting program does establish a maximum level of emissions, but 
this is only in regard to administratively established standards, such as 
NAAQSs and SIPs.
259
  Again, EPA is not attempting to regulate statio-
nary sources through the adoption of NAAQSs under the CAA.
260
  
Thus, the applicability levels established by the proposed “tailoring” 
rule clearly cannot constitute a determination of what is reasonable 
and therefore do not speak directly to the question at issue. 
Congress also has not spoken to the question of reasonableness 
in the context of GHG emissions.  As an initial matter, whether Con-
gress intended the CAA to apply to GHGs in the first place is not at 
all clear.
261
  Even assuming that it did, however, it cannot be further 
 
 257 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,533 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
51, 52, 70, 71). 
 258 See id. at 55,303. 
 259 See 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(1), (3). 
 260 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,888 (proposed 
Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
 261 See Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act Before S. Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 110th Cong. 1–2 (2008) (statement of Marlo Lewis, Senior Fel-
low, Competitive Enterprises Institute).  But cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
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assumed that the 100 or 250 tpy applicability levels found in the statu-
tory text in regard to PSD and Title V regulation stands for the prop-
osition that emissions above that level are unreasonable for GHGs.  
There is simply a lack of congressional intent in this regard.  Further, 
it would seem illogical for Congress to apply only BACT to an emis-
sion level that it considers unreasonable, as opposed to lowest achiev-
able emissions rate (LAER)
262
—a stricter requirement—as Congress 
mandated in the preconstruction nonattainment NSR permitting 
program.
263
  This dichotomy in the technology mandated under the 
Act indicates the inherent nature of NAAQSs and further unders-
cores the notion that Congress intended these levels (i.e., NAAQSs) 
to be synonymous with a determination of reasonableness.  In other 
words, a NAAQS established by the EPA serves as the level above 
which emissions giving rise to that level of pollution become unrea-
sonable.  This indicates that Congress essentially left the ultimate 
question of what pollution levels are unreasonable to the expert 
judgment of the EPA. 
Additionally, this gives further credence to the assertion stated 
above that the “tailoring” rule cannot constitute a determination of 
reasonableness by the EPA.  Because Congress gave authority to the 
EPA to determine reasonableness of pollution concentration levels 
through the promulgation of NAAQSs, it seems illogical that an ad-
ministrative rulemaking concerning the PSD permitting program 
could also serve as a statement of what is reasonable.  If the PSD per-
mitting program applies and its requirements are met, a presumption 
that these emission levels are reasonable applies. This is because the 
PSD program prohibits new stationary sources from emitting pollu-
tants that result in pollution levels resulting in non-attainment or 
above levels proscribed in a SIP.
264
  Therefore, any change in this 
program cannot constitute a reasonableness determination because 
 
528–29 (2007) (holding that Congress intended the CAA to cover all airborne com-
pounds based on the repeated use of the word “any” in the statutory text). 
 262 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (2006)  
The term ‘lowest achievable emission rate’ means for any source, that 
rate of emissions which reflects (A) the most stringent emission limita-
tion which is contained in the implementation plan or any State for 
such class or category of source, unless the owner or operator of the 
proposed source demonstrates that such limitations are not achievable, 
or (B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in prac-
tice by such class or category of source, whichever is more stringent. 
Id. 
 263 Id. § 7503(a)(2). 
 264 See id. § 7475(a). 
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the fact that the program applies (assuming it is properly complied 
with) results in a presumption of reasonableness. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, Congress did not 
speak directly to the ultimate question at issue in global-warming-as-
public-nuisance suits because regulations under PSD and Title V deal 
only in terms of technology.
265
  Use of particular technology touches 
on emissions levels, but does not prescribe them.  No emissions stan-
dards are ever set.  Therefore, a situation could develop in which 
Source A emits many times more GHGs than Source B, but both are 
employing the BACT available to them.  Under this situation, the 
question of global climate change—and thus, total GHG emissions—
is never directly spoken to.  Rather, in this situation both Source A 
and Source B are meeting their statutory requirements under the 
permitting program, but Source A is presumably acting more unrea-
sonably because it is contributing more to an increase in global warm-
ing due to its much higher emission levels. 
Therefore, the PSD and Title V programs—by themselves and 
without a requisite endangerment finding pursuant to § 108 and 
promulgation of NAAQSs—are simply another set of regulations 
touching air pollution and not a comprehensive scheme that displac-
es the federal common law as to stationary sources.  This leads to the 
conclusion that federal public nuisance actions against stationary 
sources for their contributions to global warming are not displaced 
under the currently proposed and finalized regulations. 
D. A Lack of Judicial Guidance for Determining Redress for Past 
Damages and a Common Sense Approach 
Another key distinction to address in a displacement analysis is 
the distinction between equitable and legal remedies.  Equitable re-
lief, in general, is meant to abate an ongoing injury—in this case an 
ongoing nuisance.
266
  As such, assuming that an endangerment and 
cause or contribute finding for GHGs, the “light-duty vehicle” rule, 
and the “tailoring” rule are in place at the time of initiation of a pub-
lic nuisance suit for global warming, injunctive remedies sought un-
der public nuisance claims for ongoing harms would be displaced in-
sofar as the source is subject to those regulations (e.g., displaced for 
 
 265 See § 7475(a)(4); see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,298 (proposed Oct. 27, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) (noting that the Title V permit-
ting program adds no new substantive regulatory component). 
 266 See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 726 n.1 (1999) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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mobile sources if tailpipe emission standards are established).  Where 
this analysis becomes muddled, however, is when plaintiffs are seek-
ing legal relief. 
One purpose of damages in tort is “to give compensation, in-
demnity or restitution for harms.”
267
  To achieve this redress, “[o]ne 
injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages from the 
other for all harm, past, present, and perspective, legally caused by 
the tort.”
268
  Furthermore, “the law of torts attempts primarily to put 
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his 
position prior to the tort.”
269
  The CAA provides the means to ade-
quately deal with damages in all three contexts (stationary, mobile, 
and fuel sources) on a forward-going basis.  As noted above,
270
 the 
CAA provides the Administrator the power to file civil actions against 
those who violate regulations promulgated under the Act.
271
  Thus, 
Congress provides the means for remedial action under the CAA that 
was missing in the Nonintercourse Act during the time in question in 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation where the Court held that the 
statute did not speak directly to the question of damages.
272
  But the 
CAA, even with the requisite administrative regulation of stationary, 
mobile, and fuel sources, is silent as to remedies for past GHG emis-
sions. 
Little guidance is available from courts in the context of damag-
es for pre-regulation torts committed when a statute currently dis-
places the federal common law.  In fact, the district court in California 
v. GMC seemed cognizant of this lack of judicial direction.  In discuss-
ing whether global-warming-as-public-nuisance cases present “a lack 
of judicially discoverable or manageable standards”
273
 by which to re-
solve the plaintiff’s claim, the court noted that the present suit for 
damages was legally distinguishable from prior cases presenting a pol-
lution-as-public-nuisance claim.
274
  The court stated that “[l]egally, 
these cases are distinguishable because the remedies sought therein 
were equitable remedies to enjoin or abate the nuisance, rather than 
 
 267 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979). 
 268 Id. § 910 (emphasis added). 
 269 Id. § 901 cmt. a. 
 270 See supra Part IV.A–C. 
 271 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7524(b) (2006). 
 272 Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 237 (1985). 
 273 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 274 California v. GMC, No. 06-05755, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, *46 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 27, 2007). 
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the legal remedy of monetary damages sought in the current case.”
275
  
By stating this, the court was implying that the question of displace-
ment for the pre-regulation damages caused by inter-state pollution 
has never been adequately addressed by the federal judiciary. 
This lack of judicial guidance is further complicated by the fact 
that the CAA only considers future activities in its statutory text.  For 
example, in the context of mobile source regulation under the CAA, 
the EPA administrator has the authority to regulate only “new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.”
276
  Further, the CAA is devoid 
of remedies for the emission of pollution that occurs prior to the 
enactment of regulations under §§ 108 (stationary sources), 202 
(mobile sources), or 211 (fuels).  This is because those emissions that 
cause the alleged damage were not considered “criteria” pollutants 
under the CAA at the time of their release and are thus not subject to 
the Act’s jurisdiction.  Therefore, harms caused by their release 
would go un-redressed were this statutory scheme to displace claims 
seeking damages for past torts.  Therefore, the CAA—even if the re-
quisite regulations were adopted under §§ 108, 202, or 211—likely 
would not displace global-warming-as-public-nuisance actions for pre-
regulation damages (i.e., prior to a rulemaking under the requisite 
section) because the statute does not speak directly to past emissions 
of “criteria” pollutants. 
Again, as the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Texas, 
“[M]ere refusal to legislate . . . falls far short of an expression of legis-
lative intent to supplant the existing common law in that area.”
277
  No 
language in the CAA indicates congressional intent to supplant the 
remedies available to litigants for the pre-regulation torts committed 
by emitters of GHGs; the Act is silent on the question of past damag-
es.  Furthermore, civil penalties could not be issued for past emissions 
because, as noted earlier, these emissions would not be under the ju-
risdiction of the statute.  Therefore, the presumption favoring the 
continued existence of federal common law is not overcome.
278
  As a 
result, language indicating that pre-regulation emission of “criteria” 
pollutants (in this case, GHGs) is not to be considered unreasona-
ble—and thus such pollutants retroactively fall under the jurisdiction 
of the CAA—would need to be added to the statutory or regulatory 
 
 275 Id. 
 276 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 277 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 (1993) (citing Brief for the Petition-
ers at 16, United States v. Texas, No. 91-1729 (Nov. 19, 1992)).   
 278 See id. at 534; Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 
(1991) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). 
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language in order to avoid a displacement scheme where pre-
regulation damages are still recoverable under the federal common 
law.
279
  By including language such as this, the statutory text would 
undercut any such argument against displacement by showing legisla-
tive intent to displace the federal common law.  Language to this ef-
fect, however, is currently not in the CAA, the final endangerment 
and cause or contribute finding, or any of the proposed or finalized 
regulations.  Thus, nothing in the current statutory or regulatory text 
would displace future federal public-nuisance claims seeking redress 
for the contribution to global warming from the pre-regulation emis-
sions of GHGs by stationary and mobile sources or fuel producers. 
V. PLOTTING THE COURSE AHEAD 
Whether the regulatory regime currently proposed will be put 
into effect is not at all certain.  Despite the significant opportunity for 
input, some individuals and industry groups opposed to regulation of 
GHGs will attempt to use the courts to stop these rulemakings.  The 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, had threatened to bring 
legal action to prevent the official adoption of the proposed endan-
germent and cause or contribute finding.
280
  In fact, before the re-
quired deadline for filing such suits, at least sixteen parties have filed 
suit against the EPA in order to prevent the endangerment and cause 
or contribute finding from taking effect.
281
  But following the recent 
decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in AEP, a change of 
heart is likely amongst industry groups.  Industry groups would much 
more likely prefer to face a consistent regulatory scheme rather than 
a series of suits in district courts over public nuisance claims.  In fact, 
prior to the Second Circuit’s decision, several industry groups—
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—were pressing for a full 
evidentiary hearing on the proposed endangerment finding, likely 
designed to delay regulation as long as possible.
282
  After the Second 
 
 279 As the Supreme Court noted in New Jersey v. New York, federal common law is 
“subject to the paramount authority of Congress.”  New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 
336, 348 (1931).  Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts is enlightening in its 
provision stating that “court[s] may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1979). 
 280 Jim Tankersley, Vehicle Emissions Are Targeted; A Suit Seeks to Block the EPA Waiver 
that Allowed the State to Set Its Own Standards, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at B1 (“The 
Chamber of Commerce also has threatened to sue to stop a proposed climate-related 
ruling by the EPA: the ‘endangerment finding.’”).  
 281 Bravender, supra note 158. 
 282 See Petition of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America for 
EPA to Conduct Its Endangerment Finding Proceeding On The Record Using Ad-
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Circuit’s decisions, however, several industry titans renounced their 
membership in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce because of its posi-
tion on global-climate-change legislation.
283
  Furthermore, under the 
proposed Waxman-Markey Bill, the EPA would be stripped of its au-
thority to find carbon dioxide an air pollutant under the CAA, al-
though this would be in exchange for comprehensive climate-change 
legislation.
284
  Such legislation, however, seems a long way off.
285
 
What is clear after the recent decisions by the Second Circuit in 
AEP and the Fifth Circuit in Comer is that there is a heated debate and 
much uncertainty over how to address the issue of global climate 
change.  The question now presented is how best to move forward in 
light of these circuit court decisions.  A consistent, comprehensive 
scheme seems like the best option.  Industry groups are now seeming-
ly open to a vast amount of liability for their pre-regulation contribu-
tions to global climate change, at least in the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits.  The Second Circuit made the prospect of liability even more 
perilous to industry groups by upholding standing not only for states 
suing as parens partriae, but also by upholding Article III standing for 
the City of New York and private land trusts.
286
  Therefore, a large 
number of prospective plaintiffs now exist to enforce their common 
law right to be free from unreasonable GHG emissions leading to 
global climate change.  It is unlikely that industry groups would pre-
fer to be subject to the sometimes varying and contradictory decisions 
of the judicial process.  At least one commentator, for example, has 
compared these early global-warming-as-public-nuisance suits with the 
early litigation against asbestos and tobacco companies, which have 
cost those companies millions.
287
  Thus, even though industry groups 
have resisted regulation in the past, they would most likely prefer to 
be subject to a consistent—although light—comprehensive legislative 
scheme in the future. 
 
ministrative Procedure Act §§ 556 and 557, EPA Docket ID EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0171 
(June 23, 2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/ 
comments/090623_epa_petition.pdf.  
 283 Clifford Krauss & Kate Galbraith, Climate Bill Splits Exelon and Chamber of Com-
merce, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at B1. 
 284 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 
811, 831–835 (2009). 
 285 See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 29.  
 286 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 332–49 (2d Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174). 
 287 See John Schwartz, Courts as Battlefields in Climate Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2010, at A1. 
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One possible solution would be to avoid regulation under the 
CAA altogether and let courts handle this matter strictly as a public 
nuisance, as discussed earlier.
288
  The problem with this suggestion is 
that emitters of GHGs currently do not, and would not for a substan-
tial period of time, have any indication of what is reasonable in the 
context of GHG emissions.  Additionally, courts can often come to 
conflicting decisions, which would leave industry groups uncertain as 
to what measures are appropriate to avoid liability.  Other questions 
are left to be addressed as well.  For example, is the reasonableness of 
the amount of GHG emissions variable depending on what purpose 
those emissions achieve?  Is it reasonable to allow companies produc-
ing electricity, and therefore furthering our energy independence, to 
emit more GHGs into the air than other industries that are less im-
portant to our national security?  Or is reasonableness a per se mea-
surement?  These and other similar questions demonstrate that judi-
cial regulation of GHG emissions proves to be an unworkable scheme 
in the short term because of its inherent uncertainty and a more 
comprehensive legislative system is needed to address all concerns 
raised in this complex area. 
The question also must be asked whether the CAA is the proper 
place to provide this regulation or whether separate legislation is ne-
cessary to address the problem of GHG emissions.  As explained 
above, the CAA supplies at least a partially viable tool for displacing 
the federal common law of public nuisance, alleviating the fear of in-
dustry groups likely to result from the AEP and Comer decisions.289  
This may serve as a temporary stop-gap measure while future com-
prehensive legislation is considered.  The problems posed by the ab-
sence of language addressing pre-regulation emissions, however, 
make the CAA an incomplete tool for total regulation—and thus, to-
tal displacement.  This concern can only be addressed by new statuto-
ry language indicating congressional intent to displace pre-regulation 
damages by retroactively making past emissions fall within the sta-
tute’s jurisdiction.  This is clearly an incredibly complex area and a 
comprehensive scheme seems to be the only plausible route to fully 
meeting the challenges posed by GHG emissions.  Because of this, a 
new statutory scheme, similar to that being proposed in Congress,
290
 
must be adopted and put into place.  Without a comprehensive 
scheme to displace the federal common law completely, inconsistent 
judgments and regulatory uncertainty on behalf of industry groups 
 
 288 See supra Part II.A. 
 289 See supra Part IV. 
 290 H.R. 2454. 
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will continue even after administrative action by the EPA to address 
global climate change under the CAA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sparked by seeming inaction in Washington to fully address the 
concerns about global climate change, plaintiffs over the last few 
years have taken matters into their own hands by filing federal com-
mon law nuisance claims against emitters of GHGs.  Initially, such ef-
forts were met with resistance in district courts, where several cases 
were dismissed on political question grounds.  Until recently no ap-
pellate court had addressed the issue.  Although this is not a settled 
question, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate 
court to address whether global-warming-as-public-nuisance claims 
present nonjusticiable political questions.  The Second Circuit held 
that such claims are in fact justiciable.  A panel decision in the Fifth 
Circuit has since followed suit.  The Second Circuit in AEP further 
held that under the present configuration of the CAA, the Act did 
not displace federal common law for the public nuisance of global 
climate change.  But the court was clear that the CAA could provide a 
vehicle for common law displacement pursuant to the EPA’s rule-
making power.  The Supreme Court has since granted a writ of certi-
orari to potentially address several of the complicated issues pre-
sented by the litigants in AEP. 
Currently, the EPA has adopted a final endangerment and cause 
or contribute finding under § 202 of the CAA, which regulates mo-
bile sources.  Further, the EPA has finalized the adoption of tailpipe 
emissions standards for “light-duty vehicles” in accordance with this 
finding.  The EPA has also finalized a “tailoring” rule aimed at regu-
lating large stationary sources.  But, no regulation has been proposed 
under § 211 to regulate fuel content.  An analysis of the CAA, with 
the final endangerment and cause or contribute finding under § 202, 
the “light-duty vehicle” rule, and the proposed “tailoring” rule all of-
ficially adopted, reveals that a unique displacement scheme would 
emerge. 
Federal public-nuisance claims against fuel producers would not 
be displaced because no regulatory or statutory language would speak 
directly to those sources.  Though an argument could be made that 
the contribution of fuel producers to global climate change has been 
displaced because the burning of fuel in mobile sources would be 
subject to emission standards, those arguments are likely to fail be-
cause the statutory language provides no means of redress without a 
requisite rulemaking under § 211.  In contrast, public nuisance ac-
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tions against mobile sources, such as car manufacturers, for their 
contribution to global warming would almost certainly be displaced 
because the EPA is seeking to regulate tailpipe emissions and the 
CAA provides a means of redress for violations of these regulations.  
Displacement as to stationary sources provides a tougher question. 
If an endangerment finding is made pursuant to § 108 and 
NAAQs are developed, the common law would likely be displaced 
with respect to stationary sources.  This is because NAAQSs would di-
rectly regulate GHG emissions and provide a means of redress for vi-
olation of these standards.  Furthermore, many more sources are ad-
dressed through SIPs because of the lower statutory threshold—as 
opposed to the regulation of only large stationary sources resulting 
from the “tailoring” rule—and pollution levels are dealt with directly.  
The EPA, however, has not proposed to do this.  Rather, stationary 
sources—specifically large stationary sources—are going to be regu-
lated pursuant to the permitting programs of PSD and Title V in ac-
cordance with the proposed “tailoring” rule.  These permitting pro-
grams will regulate only the technology, as determined on a case-by-
case basis, that is used by large stationary sources and do not directly 
regulate GHG emissions or establish the level above which GHG 
emissions are unreasonable.  In addition, only some stationary 
sources will fall under the ambit of these permitting schemes, and 
therefore—absent a legislative or regulatory determination that they 
are not harmful—whether these permitting schemes are sufficiently 
comprehensive is questionable.  Thus, regardless of the fact that 
these permitting programs provide means of redress for violations of 
these standards, no displacement is likely to occur.  Regulating only 
some sources and only the technology used on a case-by-case basis, 
while not regulating the overall emissions, does not speak directly to 
the question at issue (i.e., total GHG-emission levels) and therefore 
does not displace the common law. 
The CAA, even with the proposed and final regulations in place, 
does not provide redress for pre-regulation emissions.  In fact, the 
reasonableness of pre-regulation emissions is not mentioned any-
where in the CAA or in any of the final or proposed regulations.  Lit-
tle judicial guidance is available in this area, but the CAA does not 
seem to speak directly to the issue of pre-regulation torts.  As a result, 
federal public nuisance law would remain available to plaintiffs seek-
ing damages for pre-regulation GHG emissions, as in the case of Na-
tive Village of Kivalina.  Pre-regulation emissions must be addressed le-
gislatively in order to displace the federal common law in this area. 
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Industry groups will likely not be happy about the prospect of 
facing de facto regulation through the judicial process, which is the 
apparent reality that some industry groups now face after the deci-
sions in AEP and Comer.  Without thorough judicial precedent to 
guide them, much uncertainty remains for groups that will be subject 
to this de facto regulation.  Many of the fears espoused in earlier dis-
trict court cases relying on the political question doctrine reemerge 
in this context.  For example, questions about what role national se-
curity should play in a determination of reasonableness are left un-
answered.  Such questions leave industry groups without reliable gui-
deposts by which to regulate their GHG emissions or take other 
necessary steps in order to limit their possible liability.  The prospect 
of de facto regulation seems even more perilous for large stationary 
sources under the emerging regulatory scheme.  Assuming that these 
proposed regulations are all officially adopted, large stationary 
sources will not only be facing vast amounts of possible liability, but 
they also face increased regulatory costs pursuant to PSD and Title V.  
This makes partial regulation under the CAA seem incomplete and, 
in some sense, unfair.  Still, these recent circuit decisions and final 
and proposed rulemakings by the EPA are a vital first step in fighting 
the battle against global climate change.  Hopefully, the Second and 
Fifth Circuits have supplied the motivation for those in Washington 
to act and finally create a comprehensive approach to what is argua-
bly the greatest challenge facing civilization in the coming decades. 
 
